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1. Introduction 
In development thinking, poverty has always held center stage. Throughout the decades 
following the Second World War, different strategies of reducing the ever-present poverty in the 
South have surfaced, become popular, and been the main focus for the many development actors 
for varying time periods. These strategies have focused on a range of issues, from grand 
theoretical questions of how to organize a country’s economy to questions concerning the most 
effective fuel for indoor-cooking. The end goal has always been the same: the eradication of 
poverty in developing countries. 
Thus, the approaches to “solving” the poverty problem have been many, and the topic 
of this thesis is one of those approaches: social protection. In a sense, this is a new approach, 
but it builds on old ideas. For Hanlon et al. (2010: 4), social protection represents a 
“paradigmatic shift in poverty reduction”, thus representing something new, but they put this 
shift in the context of the extensive social protection systems that have existed in most 
developed nations since the late 19
th
 Century. Their claim is that the lessons from this system 
are now being applied in the developing world, with an aim of redistributing income and 
lessening poverty. These are old ideas being implemented in a new setting. 
 In developed nations, the importance of social protection schemes is plain. Here, most 
countries have had comprehensive social protection schemes for a long time, and these 
schemes have come to cover many different aspects of life, from infancy to old age. In the 
South, the situation has been very different, as formal protection schemes have been few and 
far between, and the ones that were in place had very limited coverage. Extending these 
schemes has often been thought of as too costly and of secondary importance to economic 
development when it comes to reducing poverty. If one examines the history of today’s 
developed countries, however, it is plain that economic development and social development 
have gone hand in hand, rather than one coming before the other (Townsend 2009). 
 When implementing social protection, a country has many alternative approaches to 
choose from. Among these are pension schemes, in order to protect the elderly and potentially 
lift them out of poverty. While many developing countries have contributory pension schemes 
in place, where workers pay part of their salary each month and receive benefits when they 
retire, these cover very small portions of the population, and can therefore be accompanied by 
a non-contributory pension scheme, directed at the poorest. 
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 The reasons for helping the elderly are many. One significant worry, one that applies 
to many countries around the world, is that the global population is ageing. While I will go 
further into this later, I can here mention that the United Nations Population Division (UNPD) 
estimates that the number of older people in developing regions will triple from 2000 to 2050, 
becoming the fastest growing segment of the population (UNPD 2009). In addition to this 
come the poor living conditions for many of the world’s elderly, and the lack of services and 
protection they face in most developing countries. Together, this justifies interventions on 
their part, and pension schemes seem like a good option. 
 It is not all that simple, however. Ageing populations and impoverished older people 
are often perceived to be a significant burden, standing in the way of economic development 
(Lloyd-Sherlock 2010). This perception hinders the implementation of appropriate protection 
policies, and marginalizes the elderly from the development process. There are also often 
considerable constraints to implementing social protection in developing countries, e.g. 
related to resources, which provide further problems. It should also be pointed out that 
pensions are not guaranteed to lift old people out of poverty. Instead, the success of each 
pension scheme depends on its design and on the local and national context: it is thus always 
an empirical question. 
 In this thesis I will address these questions. By using the example of the non-
contributory pension scheme in Lesotho, I will explore the process of implementing social 
protection in developing countries, looking at how constraints can be overcome and what 
consequences can be found. I will also look at the justification for directing such a transfer at 
the elderly, considering both potential benefits and downsides. The research question for the 
thesis is as follows: 
How has the Lesotho pension scheme been implemented, and what 
consequences can be identified? 
This can be further refined through four sub-questions: 
1. How has Lesotho overcome the various constraints connected to implementing social 
protection in developing countries? 
2. Why choose a pension scheme over other social protection alternatives? 
3. Who has benefited from the pension? 
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Chapter Outline 
The outline of this thesis will be as follows: first, I will briefly examine the context of Lesotho, 
noting the most important background information. In the third chapter, I will explore issues 
related to social protection, clarifying the concept and looking at the potential challenges 
developing countries will face in trying to implement different protection schemes. I will also 
consider the identified consequences of social protection in other developing countries. Then, 
I turn to the situation of old people in developing countries, discussing the characteristics of 
their poverty and the contribution they make to their households. After this, I will discuss 
pension schemes specifically, seeing how they are organized and implemented. I will explore 
consequences of an existing pension scheme, namely the South African one, to better 
understand what can be expected from the pension scheme in Lesotho. 
 In the methodology chapter, I will explain my approach to the field, looking at 
potential problems and biases that are part of any research project, as well as discussing how I 
overcame these. Finally, I will turn to the results from my fieldwork in Lesotho. Here, I will 
first discuss the process of implementation and see how Lesotho solved the questions related 
to this, before examining the impacts that I have been able to identify. In the concluding 
chapter, I try to gather the threads by summarizing the main findings and putting these in the 
context of the preceding chapters. 
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2. Background 
Before, it is important to examine the context of Lesotho. Lesotho is a small and mountainous 
constitutional monarchy in southern Africa, with a population of over 1,9 million
1
 people, 
called the Basotho. About 70% of the Basotho live in a relatively small portion of the country, 
the lowlands or foothills to the west and northwest in the country, while the rest live in the 
more remote and mountainous eastern regions (Bureau of Statistics 2009). Though 
concentrated in a relatively small portion of the country, 77% of the population of Lesotho is 
found in rural areas.  
 The relative scarcity of natural resources in Lesotho has led the economy to be charac-
terized by export of human resources (Wason and Hall 2004). This has mainly taken the form 
of migrant work in the mines of South Africa. The migration-based economy has led to 
remittances being the primary income for many households, and has also meant that many 
households have been headed by females, as the mining migrants were all male. Migrant work 
has, however, declined rapidly in recent years, due to the introduction of labor saving 
technologies and a worldwide drop in the price of gold. This has led to a drop in employment 
of migrant workers and thus impacted the remittances sent home by Basotho miners.  
 Agricultural activities have also suffered from a decline. Both the amount of rangeland 
and arable land has decreased, and there have been widespread thefts of livestock (Wason and 
Hall 2004). As a result of this, crop production and other agricultural products have dropped 
dramatically, both for consumption and export, and agriculture has lost its place as the 
mainstay of the economy, making Lesotho dependent on importing food. It is important to 
point out that while the macro-economic impact of agriculture might be negligible, its 
importance in micro-economic terms is paramount: it is still a way of life for the rural poor 
(Sechaba Consultants 2000). 
 Despite the declines in the Basotho’s traditional economic activities, the country 
experienced considerable economic growth throughout the 1990s, averaging 6% between 
1987 and 1997 (Wason and Hall 2004). Since then, growth has slowed down, but remained 
respectable in the context of sub-Saharan Africa.
2
 This economic growth has mainly been due 
to the increased building activity that took place as part of the series of dam constructions 
known as the Lesotho Highlands Water Project. Additionally, the textile industry has made up 
                                                          
1
 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/lt.html [accessed 07.05.12] 
2
 http://www.indexmundi.com/g/g.aspx?c=lt&v=66 [accessed 07.05.12] 
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for some of the loss of jobs for migrant workers: through special trade agreements, Lesotho 
could export clothing duty- and quota-free, leading to a strong growth in the sector in the first 
half of the 2000s (ODI 2009). The expiration of some of these agreements has led to some 
decline here as well, but textile exports still contribute 19% of Lesotho’s GDP. 
Despite the growth in economy during the last decades, Lesotho is one of the poorest 
countries in the world, currently ranking as no. 141 of the 161 countries on the Human 
Development Index developed by UNDP.
3
 As already mentioned, this means that the country 
belongs to the United Nations’ category of Least Developed Countries (LDCs). The reason 
for this is the high level of inequality in the country, causing the economic growth to have 
little impact on poverty (Wason and Hall 2004). This inequality manifests itself in the 
rural/urban divide, where the former is significantly worse off than the latter. The difference 
between rural and urban areas has been exacerbated by the growth of industry in urban centers 
and the decline of agriculture, further favoring the urban areas.  
There is also another such divide, namely in the difference between lowlands and 
highlands. In the mountains, 32% of households belong to the poorest quintile in the country; 
children are less likely to attend school; infrastructure, access to services and facilities are 
poor; and employment levels are low (Sechaba Consultants 2000). This discrepancy leads to 
more migration and urbanization, which in turn leads to declining proportions of wage-earners 
in the urban or peri-urban areas of the country. Even though poverty is concentrated in the 
mountain areas, poverty levels are high throughout the country. Sechaba Consultants (2000) 
estimate that 68% of the population lives in poverty, with barely enough cash income to 
satisfy basic needs. Those with access to paid labor, an estimated 35%, have seen their 
incomes rise in the past ten-year period, which has further exacerbated inequality (Bureau of 
Statistics 2009).  
In addition to widespread poverty and high inequality, another important characteristic 
of Lesotho is the very high incidence of HIV/AIDS. In the adult population (aged 15-49), 
there is a prevalence rate of 24%
4
. This is one of the highest prevalence rates in the world, and 
means that a quarter million people are infected. Obviously, such a high rate has profound 
consequences, and could even plunge households into poverty, as families lose breadwinners 
or sell off assets to pay medical costs (Wason and Hall 2004). It has also caused an increase in 
the number of orphans, leaving their care to grandparents. 
                                                          
3
 http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/ [accessed 06.10.11] 
4
 http://www.unaids.org/en/regionscountries/countries/lesotho/ [accessed 07.05.12] 
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To paint a completely negative picture would, however, be a disservice to the Basotho. 
While formal employment is scarce, informal employment is an important way of living for 
many, without showing up in official statistics. One estimation states that about a quarter of 
all households have incomes from the informal sector (Sechaba Consultants 2000). 
Additionally, money is not the only asset for a household, and a typical Basotho household is 
often in possession of other valuable assets. For one thing, access to land and water is 
equitable, providing many households with the opportunity to grow their own food or keep 
livestock. Another important asset is the community or family ties, as 20% of households 
report receiving gifts of some sort. This keeps the truly poor alive, as all families living above 
the subsistence line participate in these informal social protection mechanisms. Finally, 
government programs are helping many of the poorest families. This includes easy access to 
primary schooling, which has resulted in comparatively high rates of literacy, and a recent 
push towards affordable health care, which has eliminated a number of debilitating diseases 
(Wason and Hall 2004). 
These sets of assets have kept many households above or right on the brink of poverty 
even in times of widespread unemployment, and are of great importance. Still, the lack of 
paid labor has increased the pressure on natural resources, which could turn out to be 
detrimental to future generations. Informal social protection could also collapse if the 
situation continues to be desperate, plunging even more people into poverty. 
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3. Social Protection 
While the focus of this thesis is the old age pension in Lesotho, I will in this chapter discuss 
social protection in general, clarifying the concept as well as looking at the practicalities of 
implementing protection schemes in the South and identifying some of the consequences. 
Such a discussion will be valuable for understanding the rationale behind and the expectations 
for the pension scheme in Lesotho. With this broad approach, it becomes clearer that the 
Lesotho pension scheme represents a new direction within development thinking and practice, 
and it will be easier to see if the Lesotho experience has any relevance for other countries 
seeking to implement similar social protection schemes.  
What is social protection? 
First off, it is important to define what exactly social protection is, and why it is thought to be 
an effective answer to the poverty problem in the developing world. As with any academic 
term, there are several different definitions of social protection. Additionally, there are a 
number of similar concepts, sometimes used interchangeably and sometimes not. On top of 
this, the term has taken on new meanings upon its introduction to the developing world. It is 
important to clear up any confusion surrounding these terms, as they are important throughout 
this thesis. 
 In order to discover what social protection means, and also to illustrate some of the 
key differences within the field, it is instructive to turn to the multilateral institutions, all of 
which have social protection on their agendas, albeit in different forms. The IMF, for instance, 
defines social protection as “systematic interventions intended to relieve households and 
individuals of the burden of a defined set of social risks” (IMF 2001: 18). For the ILO, social 
protection is “the set of public measures that a society provides for its members to protect 
them against economic distress” arising from a number of different sources, and it is 
underlined that social protection is a “fundamental human right” to which “everyone is 
entitled” (Bonilla García and Gruat 2003: 13-14). The United Nations operates with a third 
definition, understanding social protection as  
“a set of public and private policies and programmes undertaken by societies in 
response to various contingencies in order to offset the absence or substantial 
reduction of income from work; provide assistance for families with children; and 
provide people with health care and housing.” (United Nations 2000: 4) 
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This report goes on to say that the operation of social protection is underpinned by a social 
consensus about the acceptable levels of income, livelihood, employment, health services, 
education services, nutrition and shelter. 
 Munro (2008) distinguishes three different justifications for social protection, which 
relate to each of the three definitions above: the risk school focuses on the failures in 
insurance markets that cause the inability to cover against all forms of risk; the social and 
economic rights school emphasizes the obligation on part of the state to fulfill their citizen’s 
basic rights, as defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other sources of 
international law; and lastly a needs-based doctrine asserting that reducing poverty is of both 
moral and practical importance, using both moral and economic arguments to support social 
protection measures. As Barrientos and Hulme (2008) point out, each of these justifications 
can be related to a different institution, reflecting their approaches to development in general: 
IMF and the World Bank embodies the risk school, ILO argues the case of social and 
economic rights, and the United Nations takes a basic needs-approach. Of course, the division 
is not as clear-cut as this in all cases, but the three discourses tend to run in parallel, 
intersecting in few places (Munro 2008).  
 The differing justifications for social protection are important, because they give rise 
to different approaches to implementing social protection policies. Focusing exclusively on 
market failures and risk, for instance, lacks the important moral dimension, and may lead to a 
limited focus on economic factors in the design of social protection, sacrificing a broader 
approach to the question of poverty. A rights-based approach could suffer under the 
difficulties of creating a hierarchy of rights, or deciding which rights violations are the most 
serious (Barrientos and Hulme 2008). This leads to difficulties in the face of scarcity, as it 
fails to negotiate the tough trade-offs and compromises that need to be made as social 
protection is introduced to developing countries.  
In one way, following the needs-based approach combines the instrumental focus of 
the risk school, i.e. that social protection can be understood as an investment with private as 
well as social returns, with the moral weight of the rights school, i.e. that social protection is a 
good in and of itself since it provides aid to the poor. Munro (2008) also lays out a third 
argument in favor of the needs-based approach, namely that it can be seen to benefit both rich 
and poor, for instance by limiting the spread of infectious diseases, which makes it more 
politically acceptable. Still, he criticizes the approach for lacking a specific understanding of 
social protection in simply assuming that the state should play a strong role, but not 
specifying what this role should consist of. Another criticism, leveled from the rights school, 
11 
 
is that a basic needs-approach is paternalistic and welfarist, ignoring the rights, the dignity 
and the agency of the poor. 
 In the end, the best definition of social protection would be one that combines the fact 
that it is a right of all poor, but that its first task should be in providing protection of the most 
basic needs. Van Ginneken (2003b: 36) provides such a definition, in understanding social 
protection as  
 “entitlement to benefits that society provides to individuals and households – through 
public and collective measures – to protect against low or declining living standards 
arising out of a number of basic risks and needs.” 
Van Ginneken (2003a: 11) explains that this definition makes it clear that social protection  
“is not only concerned with cash benefits and benefits in kind for a limited range of 
contingencies, but also with reducing the impact on the household budget of the cost 
for basic needs and capabilities, such as medical care, education, housing and 
nutrition.” 
By using this understanding of social protection, both the rights aspect and the basic needs 
aspects are underlined. It also recognizes the fact that protecting households against risk is 
part of social protection. Thus, it combines the perspectives cited above, and is therefore a 
suitable definition for the rest of this thesis. 
One important point remains on the issue of social protection. So far, social protection 
has been understood simply as a framework for addressing poverty and vulnerability, and this 
is also the case with the chosen definition above. Barrientos and Hulme (2008) suggest that, 
while this is certainly one of the functions of social protection, introducing social production 
schemes should also be thought to represent an alternative approach to social and economic 
development, aimed at something broader than simply reducing the incidence of poverty. This 
is particularly true in developing countries, where all public policy should aim at being 
socially transformative.  
Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux (2008) expand on this idea, arguing that social 
protection should not be limited to income transfers to impoverished individuals, but should 
also include a redistribution of assets that reduces the dependence on handouts in the long run. 
Thus, in addition to income transfers, social protection should aim to deliver other social 
services to vulnerable groups as well, making sure that all individuals are integrated equally 
into society. The example given by the authors is governmental support to trade unions: 
outside the remit of traditional protection mechanisms, such an effort could still be deemed 
social protection since it helps marginalized and vulnerable groups to claim their rights to a 
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decent wage and to decent working conditions. Other examples include educating people 
about their rights or directing transfers to women to increase equality. With such policies 
viewed as part of a social protection approach, such an approach takes on a “transformative” 
aspect, aiming at reshaping those societies it is introduced into. 
While I regard this aspect as important, it is my opinion that including it in the 
definition of social protection is broadening the concept too much. Believing in the efficacy of 
social transfers is one thing, but believing that it should be an approach to cure all the ills of 
developing countries is quite another. If social protection is thought to include “all initiatives 
that (…) enhance the social status and rights of the marginalized” (Sabates-Wheeler and 
Devereux 2008: 70) it becomes a very broad concept indeed, beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Still, the ability of a social protection scheme to transform society is important to assess, even 
if it is from a limited, ground-level viewpoint, and it will therefore be addressed also in the 
context of the Lesotho pension scheme later on. 
Types of social protection 
Even when choosing a narrower definition of social protection, it is clear that social protection 
covers a large array of interventions into many different spheres of life by a variety of actors. 
In other words, social protection can be extended to many different groups from many 
different sources, including transfers to the poor, to children or to the elderly from private, 
community-based or governmental sources. In order to link general social protection more 
closely to the pension scheme in Lesotho, it is good to look at different categories of social 
protection, so that the concept can be clarified further. 
Townsend (2009) outlines three different components to most long-standing programs 
in the North. First are universal social insurance programs, which collect contributions from 
those insured as well as from employers, pooling risk and guaranteeing defined individual 
benefits in certain situations, such as maternity or old age. Second, we have broad tax-
financed benefit schemes, which are extended to all citizens belonging to a particular social 
category, e.g. the elderly. The third and last component is social assistance schemes, which is 
more direct “poor-relief”. The recipients of these kinds of transfers are usually subjected to 
some sort of means-test, and those who qualify are provided with a minimum level of income 
or a set of benefits. 
 While these divisions are common characteristics of social protection programs in the 
developed world, their counterparts in the developing world are very different. Whereas the 
developed countries extend social assistance only to those who fall outside the two other 
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components, in the South the poor-relief aspect of social assistance makes this component 
more suitable as a main focus. As a result, the nature of social protection in the developing 
world differs significantly from that of the developed countries. These differences will be 
explored further later on. 
 Even within social assistance, there are a large number of possible interventions, and I 
want to discuss one last term in this section, namely that of social transfers. Sometimes called 
cash or income transfers, social transfers form the bulk of social assistance schemes in the 
developing world (Barrientos 2010). Social transfers are defined thus by Samson (2009: 124): 
“regular non-contributory payments of money provided by government or non-
governmental organizations to individuals or households, with the objective of 
decreasing chronic or shock-induced poverty, addressing social risk and reducing 
economic vulnerability” 
Social transfers are thus comprised of actual cash payments to achieve social protection goals. 
These cash contributions from the government can come in a number of different forms, for 
instance basic assistance to poor families, unemployment compensation and public non-
contributory pensions (Lindert 2004). Barrientos (2010) argues that income transfers have 
certain advantages that make them very suitable for reducing poverty effectively: they can be 
implemented or scaled up quickly, they have an immediate impact on consumption and they 
can reach the poorest. 
 With the term social transfers, we arrive from the overarching concept of social 
protection, establishing the need for measures to protect and aid households, through the 
subcategory of social assistance, the most usual form of social protection in the developing 
world, to the actual intervention on part of an actor to provide that protection and aid in the 
form of a concrete cash transfer. In the following discussion I will concentrate on different 
sorts of social transfers, originating from the state.  
Social protection in developing countries 
I have already pointed out how social protection has taken on new meanings upon its 
introduction to the developing world. This new approach will be further discussed in this 
section, before moving on to examine various constraints facing the implementation of social 
transfers in developing countries. 
 Before going through these topics, however, it should be noted that while the history 
of formal social protection in the South is recent and partial, informal social protection has 
long traditions. Indeed, in the absence of formal protection mechanism, the informal kind has 
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been the only real protection available to most households in developing countries, a situation 
which is still true today (Schmidt 1995). Before discussing formal social protection in the 
South, then, it is informative to examine these mechanisms more closely, as it also reveals a 
lot about the justification for moving on to more formal schemes. 
Informal social protection under pressure 
Informal social protection can be very diverse, with a number of different sources. For the 
elderly, the source of support is often the family, and for those indigents with no familial 
support, there are community-based arrangements (Ahmad 1991). Sometimes these are based 
in custom, as stated above, but they can also be based on religion. These traditional forms of 
social protection can also be very sophisticated: Ahmad (1991) gives the example of 
traditional fishing villages, where small-scale fisheries take a share of the catch of all the 
fishermen working for them and use part of this to provide for old fishermen or families 
without male wage-earners. Another example is the practice of offering employment even in 
cases where it means a reduction of income for owners and current employees. This shows 
how the collective is more important than the individual. 
 While informal social protection is often the only option available to poor households 
or individuals in certain areas, these mechanisms are under pressure. In industrial countries, 
they have already been broken down by fundamental changes in the fabric of society, 
economic, social, legal and demographic changes, and the same process is now underway in 
developing countries (World Bank 1994). A key contributor to this is increased migration: 
even though the majority of migrants feel bound by their traditional legal system, this feeling 
is weakened as the prospects of returning to the home village fades, and is weakened even 
more in subsequent generations (Schmidt 1995). As more people move to urban areas, the 
collective-based arrangements break down. 
 A fundamental flaw in informal transfers also threatens their effectiveness. In an 
increasingly populated and globalized world, the possibility of external shocks is higher than 
earlier. In one way, social protection is about pooling risk, something that is also true when it 
comes to informal transfers, where risk is pooled across all the members of a household, the 
extended household or the community at large (Ahmad 1991). Even in the case of relatively 
sophisticated informal protection schemes, all the resources pooled are local, which means 
that they cannot withstand larger-scale external shocks effectively. A downturn in the 
economy, globally or regionally, would thus seriously impact informal protection mechanisms. 
This can be illustrated by for instance pointing to the high incidence of HIV/AIDS in southern 
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Africa, which has led to many households losing working age-members, leaving fewer 
households able to assist their poorer relatives or neighbors. This, then, underlines the need 
for a pooling of risk over larger areas, in other words a more formal system.   
Formal social security in developing countries 
It could be argued that this kind of social protection has been present here for a longer time, 
but without being described as such (Ellis et al. 2009). An example of this is subsidizing food 
prices to ensure that everyone had enough to eat, which was a popular method in the 1960s 
and 1970s. When this fell out of favor, the 1980s saw a focus on “safety nets”, a minimalist 
idea predicated on the idea of helping those pockets of poor people that experience seasonal 
hunger even as the economy as a whole is moving forward.  
 These efforts proved insufficient to ensure basic needs, however, as poverty and 
vulnerability continued to rise through the 1980s. The greater openness of economies caused 
by globalization led households to be more vulnerable to changes in global markets, plunging 
more of them into poverty (Barrientos and Hulme 2008). This is also in line with Guhan 
(1994), who sees the harsh structural adjustment programs (SAPs) undertaken under the 
auspices of the World Bank and the IMF during the 1980s as one of the reasons for why the 
debate on social protection came onto the development agenda. 
 The rapid rise in poverty and vulnerability as well has the failure of the safety net 
mechanisms and the breakdown of informal social protection served to reveal the gaps present 
in formal social protection in developing countries. This also revealed the cost of not having 
efficient protection mechanisms, as their unavailability can force households to take measures 
to meet immediate needs that will hurt them in the long run, such as selling productive assets, 
taking children out of school or cutting down on health care (Barrientos and Hulme 2008). In 
this way, the absence of social protection can continue the spiral of chronic poverty. 
 Thus, the need for permanent institutional services was evident, and social protection 
could be seen as “offering the potential means for addressing the multiple factors causing 
persistent poverty and rising vulnerability” (Ellis et al. 2009: 7). Simply copying these 
schemes from the North would not be a good idea, however, as these countries established 
their social protection schemes very early in industrial history as a response to domestic 
political pressure (Townsend 2009). Now, developing countries are much worse placed to do 
the same, as they are subject to globalized pressures for productivity and attracting 
investments, as well as even more wide-spread poverty and deprivation, and an alternative 
approach was therefore called for. 
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 It is against this backdrop that the practical application of social protection in 
developing countries has taken on its own character, different from the approach in developed 
countries. While social protection in developed countries is largely focused on “transitory 
experiences of poverty in otherwise stable living conditions”, similar policies in the South 
have to combat poverty and vulnerability in situations where they are persistent and wide-
spread (UNRISD 2010: 135). Instead of treating the symptoms of poverty by transferring 
money to those who fall short of a desired minimum income, social protection in the South 
focuses more on addressing the causes of poverty, and to have a broader developmental role 
(Barrientos 2010). They are also more focused on risk and vulnerability issues in their 
approach to poverty, in recognition of the fact that these two issues severely constrain poor 
people’s opportunity to improve their own living conditions. Well-planned and targeted social 
protection schemes are uniquely able to address this, and can prevent households from 
making survival decisions that, although rational in the short-term, are detrimental to long-
term survival and development. All of these points can also be related to the definition of 
social protection from Van Ginneken (2003b) given above. 
In sum, then, social protection in developing countries must perform three main 
functions (Barrientos and Hulme 2008: 4):  
(i) to help protect basic levels of consumption among those in poverty or in 
danger of falling into poverty 
(ii) to facilitate investment in human and other productive assets that alone can 
provide escape routes from persistent and intergenerational poverty, and 
(iii) to strengthen the agency of those in poverty so that they can overcome their 
predicament 
The specific focus on poverty alleviation as part of social protection in developing countries 
has meant that the social assistance component of social protection is the most suitable option. 
As mentioned above, this component is small in developed countries and the primary priority 
is social insurance, but the opposite is true in the South (Barrientos 2010). This is another way 
in which the application of social protection in the South is differentiated from the North. The 
low level of formalization in most developing economies is an aspect of the South that 
naturally inhibits the development of social insurance schemes (Guhan 1994). When a large 
share of the working population is self-employed or works in the informal sector, it would be 
inefficient and very difficult to implement conventional social insurance schemes similar to 
those found in developed countries, because of the potential difficulties in collecting 
contributions. This means that the development of social insurance is slow in the developing 
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world, and in some cases even going the wrong way. Social assistance, on the other hand, has 
experienced a rapid growth in the last fifteen years. In addition, or by necessity, the field has 
experienced a lot of innovation in order to accommodate new groups and achieve new targets.  
 It is useful to briefly see where these ideas have been put into practice. The intro-
duction of social assistance schemes in the South has been led by the major developing 
countries, most significantly Brazil, Mexico and South Africa (Hanlon et al. 2010). These 
three have all employed very different approaches to introducing transfers, with different 
means and aims, but they are all based on the idea of improving the well-being of the poor, 
and using a broad approach to understanding poverty. One impressive aspect of these transfer 
programs is their scale: the South African Child Support Grant reaches 7,2 million children, 
the Minimum Living Standards Scheme in China reached 22,4 million in 2006 and programs 
in Mexico, Brazil and Indonesia reach 5, 11 and 15 million households respectively. This 
shows that the total contribution of social protection schemes can be substantial. 
 In Africa, social protection is rarer, but countries such as Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and 
Uganda are piloting cash transfer schemes with human development objectives (Barrientos 
2010). In southern Africa, the reliance is more heavily put on grants, often aimed at 
vulnerable groups, e.g. children or the elderly. South Africa is a major leader here, fully 
extending the former whites-only pension to all elderly in 1993 and introducing a child 
support grant in 1998 (Hanlon et al. 2010). All together, South Africa spends 12% of their 
national budget on social assistance, mostly in the forms of grants. Ellis et al. (2009) present 
fifteen case studies of social transfers from six different countries in southern Africa, showing 
the growth in these kinds of development interventions. 
Specific challenges in developing countries 
While the policy climate for social protection appears to be changing, both within and outside 
the South, there are still significant challenges facing the implementation of the concrete 
transfers. While a social transfer might aim at reducing poverty and vulnerability, facilitating 
investment and strengthen the agency of the poor, it is by no means given that this will be the 
result of a transfer program. Hanlon et al. (2010) lay out some basic principles that have to be 
met in order for social transfers to meet their goals: first, transfers have to be seen as fair by 
the populace, in that most citizens agree with the choice of recipients. Second, the transfer has 
to be assured, so that recipients are confident of receiving their benefits on time every time. 
Third, the design process of a cash transfer must make sure that the program turns out to be 
practical, with enough trained staff to administer it and a reliable system of identifying 
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recipients and delivering benefits. Fourth, the concrete transfers must be substantial, or of a 
size large enough to effect changes. Fifth, cash transfers must be popular, to ensure their 
sustainability in the political sense.   
 Each of these basic principles has specific sets of challenges to them, and can be 
connected to four different constraints to initiating social transfers in very low-income 
countries. Smith & Subbarao (2003) point to three of these, namely lack of accurate 
information to identify beneficiaries, lack of administrative capacity to target them and 
successfully run any program, and lack of fiscal resources to implement social transfers at all. 
The first two constraints are both related to the assured and practical aspects of social 
transfers, while the last one relates to them being assured and substantial. Barrientos and 
Hulme (2008) add a fourth constraint: political commitment. This relates to whether the 
transfer in question is seen as fair and whether it is popular. In the following, I will go through 
these constraints, see which concrete challenges they present and how they can be overcome. 
Resource constraints 
Perhaps the first thing that strikes an outsider when discussing the introduction of social 
protection in developing countries is whether it is financially possible. Social transfer schemes 
are often expensive, and can constitute significant spending as a share of GDP. There is also 
the fact that developing country governments are subjected to a wide range of budget pre-
ssures, having to prioritize between investments in health, education, infrastructure, and so on.  
Social protection should not be viewed exclusively as a cost, however. The fact that 
there is a significant cost to not having social protection has already been discussed, and once 
this is factored in, affordability is less of an issue (Barrientos 2010). If a government in the 
South takes the view that implementing social protection schemes is an investment in the 
future, it also seems more lucrative. Social transfers can give healthier, more educated and 
more productive populations and promote economic growth. These ideas will be discussed 
more thoroughly below, but are important to mention here, since they offset some of the 
resource constraints. 
 Still, even if social transfers are considered as an investment in the future, they still 
have to be afforded here and now. Smith and Subbarao (2003) calculate that for very low-
income countries, a transfer program that provide the poor with $20 each per year would 
amount to a cost of 5% of GDP, or 21% of public spending, a level they say is “probably 
unaffordable” (Smith and Subbarao 2003: 17) They put this in perspective by showing how a 
$ 1 transfer per month to the poorest 15% in Malawi would cost the same as the annual 
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salaries of 40,000 primary school teachers or equal the entire Ministry of Health budget. Of 
course, in addition to the financial cost of the transfer, there are expenses related to 
administration, registration and evaluation. Together, these expected costs make many 
developing countries’ governments despair in the face of implementing social transfers. 
 These projections should not be taken as absolute truths, however. While Smith and 
Subbarao deal with a “typical” very low-income country and makes assumptions as to poverty 
levels, administrative costs, GDP and public expenditure, Behrendt (2008) takes a more 
empirical approach, and examines the cost of implementing a basic social protection package 
in seven sub-Saharan countries. The full benefit package includes old age and disability 
pensions, provision of basic health care and basic education, a child benefit and targeted cash 
transfers to the poorest households, but three projections are made using different mixtures of 
these. In all three scenarios the cost level stays under 20% of GDP for six of the seven 
countries. In the most modest alternative, where especially health and education costs are 
minimized, all countries are below a 14% cost to GDP, six of them under 10%. Behrendt 
(2008: 292) sees this as being “within reasonable and affordable limits if countries and donors 
make a strong commitment to basic social protection as an essential tool of poverty reduction”. 
 Although they disagree on the affordability of social protection, both Behrendt’s and 
Smith and Subbarao’s projections show one thing: that the cost of social transfers depends 
greatly on the way they are constructed. While the costs projected by Behrendt (2008) are 
high, she also shows how removing part of the package will lower this cost, and thus each 
country can adapt it to their own needs and possibilities. 
The most obvious way of reducing protection cost is by adjusting the amount of 
money paid out. This has a large effect on total costs, but implementing countries must make 
sure that the transfer in question is still substantial enough to make a difference. Of course, in 
very poor countries, even small amounts can make a difference, but if the payment is too 
small it might not be worth even the trouble of picking it up or registering for it. An 
approximation here states that a cash transfer should not be of less value than 20% of the poor 
household’s consumption (Hanlon et al. 2010).  
Another way of keeping the cost of a social transfer down is by using different 
techniques of targeting the poor more efficiently. Hanlon et al. (2010) outline five main types 
of selection strategies. First, there is categorical selection, which extends the transfer to a 
group of people correlated with poverty, such as children or the elderly. This approach has the 
added benefit of more easily building political support, since these groups are seen as more 
“deserving” than working-age poor (Smith and Subbarao 2003). Second is geographic 
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selection, where specific communities or areas with the highest incidence of poverty are 
selected based on survey data. Thirdly, the poorest individuals can be selected as recipients 
through a means test, on household or individual level. The fourth method relies on 
community selection, where a community itself decides who are the most deserving of 
receiving cash transfers. The last method is based on self-selection, and is more of a work-fare 
program. Here, people can choose to participate in public works programs, where they are 
guaranteed the right to work at minimum wage.  
Of course, the strategies can be and are combined, to target even more accurately: for 
instance, a categorical transfer can incorporate a means test, so that only those children who 
are living beneath a certain threshold are included. Means-testing is contentious in itself, with 
proponents arguing that giving money to the rich is unethical when resources are scarce and 
that having an effective means-test means that a developing country could achieve more with 
the same amount of money (Hanlon et al. 2010). Opponents argue that means-testing is 
notoriously inaccurate, potentially socially divisive and can be very costly. 
It should be noted that while targeting and means-testing can decrease the cost of a 
program by limiting the number of beneficiaries, it also carries a cost of itself. This cost is 
higher when criteria are stricter, as administrative expenses increase (Hanlon et al. 2010). 
There are also always those who will be left out, even though they are as poor as those 
included, just as some people will be included that should not be. Nevertheless, targeting is 
useful, both in reducing the cost and increasing the economical and political feasibility of a 
social transfer, and also in ensuring that a transfer is as efficient as it can be in reducing 
poverty or achieving whatever its other goals are. 
 There are also other ways of decreasing the costs of a transfers program. While he 
himself holds the opposite view, Szreter (2007: 79) refers to the “widespread commonsense 
assumption” that poor countries would not be able to afford the systems for identity 
registration that are common in richer countries. This can be counteracted by employing voter 
registration technologies in the registration process (Hanlon et al. 2010). Such technologies 
are cheap and efficient, and could considerably reduce administrative expenses, especially in 
countries where populations are large and/or scattered.  
The cost of social transfers, then, depends on a number of factors. In the end, the 
programs need not be insurmountably expensive: the total expenditure of the extensive social 
transfers currently operating in South Africa and Brazil amount to 3,5% and 2,5% of GDP 
respectively (Hanlon et al. 2010). This holds true also in smaller and poorer developing 
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countries: the Mongolian child benefit program costs 3,9% of GDP, while the universal non-
contributory pension scheme in Namibia costs less than 2% of GDP (Pelham 2007). 
Still, even if social transfers can be affordable there is still a question of long-term 
sustainability (Barrientos 2010). In the poorest countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, 
tax revenue is very low, making the fiscal space for implementing social transfers small. One 
option here is to rely on external financing. Behrendt (2008) admits that most low-income 
countries would need financial assistance from international donors for varying lengths of 
time, and would also have to reallocate part of their current expenditure towards social 
protection spending. A problem with external financing is the long-term sustainability of a 
program. A social transfer needs to be assured, as already mentioned, and the only way it can 
truly be assured is if it is financed domestically in the medium or longer run (Barrientos 2010). 
One of the central challenges central to extending social assistance in developing countries is 
thus to strengthen and expand domestic revenue mobilization.  
Administrative constraints and information constraints 
Many developing countries lack the capacity to administrate complex public programs, as 
certain parts of government are weak and lack skilled personnel to manage and oversee 
projects (Smith and Subbarao 2003). The complexity of social transfers demands substantial 
preparation, supervision and evaluation to ensure that they are efficiently run. For strictly 
targeted programs, these demands are even higher, especially related to field staff. The 
shortage of qualified staff also means that the ones that do exist would have to be diverted 
away from other development activities, e.g. health stations or education. In light of this, it 
becomes a challenge to make a social transfer practical and assured.  
 Additionally, if a cash transfer is to be planned and targeted accurately, planners must 
have access to substantial information about the group or area in question (Smith and 
Subbarao 2003). Required information most often includes income and different demographic 
characteristics, such as household size or age. There are obvious difficulties collecting income 
data in countries where large portions of the population have no cash income, and one 
solution could be to use proxies or using more obvious characteristics usually connected to 
poverty. Examples here include orphaned children or female-headed households, but these are 
also hard to establish as there is still room for people to sidle their way into a category by 
providing false information. 
Together, these constraints favor simple program designs. Sustaining a simple 
program is easier for unskilled staff, and it is also cheaper (Smith and Subbarao 2003). In 
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addition, existing administrative systems should be utilized wherever possible: for example, 
rather than establishing a new system for delivering nutrition programs, they should be run 
through existing health stations. Through targeting measures, the information constraint can 
be minimized, either by choosing universal coverage; self-targeting programs; or community 
targeting (Smith and Subbarao 2003). The latter does not eliminate the need for accurate 
information, but delegates it to a lower level, where it is presumably better known.  
Political constraints 
While there is little doubt of the need for social protection in developing countries, whether or 
not these needs translate to the initiation of social transfers is a different question. In low-
income countries, the political system often aggregates voter’s preferences poorly, instead 
tending to nurture patron-client relationships (Barrientos and Hulme 2008). This could be 
counteracted by outside factors, such as international NGOs or donors, intervening and 
forcing social protection on to the agenda. Often, the introduction of social protection is done 
to counter real or perceived opposition to the government or the fear of social unrest. This is 
evidenced in the cases of China or Argentina, who both introduced social transfers to counter 
rising unemployment.  
In countries where losing political power through elections are a genuine concern, the 
popularity of social transfers should not be underestimated. De Britto (2008) considers the 
expansion of social protection programs in both Brazil and Mexico at least partly as a strategy 
to win votes. It should be noted, however, that social transfers directed at people in need and 
perceived as effective in reaching its goals at a reasonable cost have a considerable political 
feasibility. This is especially true for transfers directed towards children, such as in the cases 
of Brazil and Mexico, and transfers directed towards the elderly, such as in the case of South 
Africa. Promotion of human capital through child benefits and social pensions taking care of 
the elderly have appeal even to middle class voters and elites, because children and older 
people are often thought of as “deserving poor” (De Britto 2008: 186). This is a way of 
making a social transfer seem fair, then, which in turn contributes to its popularity in the 
populace and its political sustainability. 
Results of social protection 
I now turn to the very important issue of examining the impacts of social protection. While it 
is true that each social transfer program has its own set of preconditions and goals, knowledge 
can also be gained by looking at the overall effects of social protection. Additionally, results 
from other countries can serve as lessons for countries that are still on the planning stage. 
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 Before getting into the result, it is important to acknowledge that the results of social 
protection are difficult to fully untangle from the results of other societal processes. For 
example, a specific cash transfer might have the goal of improving health among the destitute, 
a goal that could more easily be achieved if there were also investments being done in health 
care, infrastructure and education.  These latter interventions would not be considered as part 
of the transfer itself, or even as social protection initiatives, but will undoubtedly affect its 
outcome. In light of this fact, it is important to recognize that social transfers are not a 
panacea to cure all the ills of developing countries, but rather an additional tool to aid in the 
process of development. 
 In this section, I will go through some results from social transfers, divided in two 
main sections: first, the results that are to do with poverty reduction and second results that 
might affect economic growth. I will focus mainly on consequences in the South, as this is the 
thesis’ main focus, but I will also refer to some evidence from the North. I do this because of 
the long history of social protection there, and the wealth of evidence available. Of course, the 
two are not immediately comparable, but it is still informative to look to the North.   
Social protection and the reduction of poverty 
As has already been shown, poverty alleviation is a central goal for social protection in 
developing countries. Of course, due to the multi-dimensionality of poverty, any social 
transfer might have a number of impacts on it. The most obvious would perhaps be the impact 
a simple cash transfer would have on income poverty, but broader effects include increasing 
food security, helping children attend school, reduce inequality, increase gender equality, 
improving health, protecting assets, allowing people to save and many more. Achieving any 
of these goals could be said to decrease the burden of poverty, and finding out whether and 
how a social transfer affects poverty is thus a very broad question. 
 Looking towards European and OECD countries shows the large potential effect of 
social transfers: The reduction of pre-tax and pre-transfer poverty headcount rates ranges from 
10 percentage points in the USA to 30 percentage points in Sweden (Cichon and Scholz 2009). 
Similar aggregate effects on poverty levels are harder to find in developing countries, because 
of the smaller scale at which social transfers operates, the shorter time frame they have been 
in operation and because even after receiving a transfer, a household might still be living in 
poverty, since the amounts involved can be small. In the absence of percentages describing 
the aggregate effects of transfers, it is more instructive to turn to case studies of individual 
social protection schemes, to provide examples of what such schemes can achieve. 
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 One important indicator of poverty is nutrition. Food is prime among basic needs, and 
poor nutrition is very often correlated with poverty. If a social transfer can better nutrition for 
a household, it can be said to impact poverty and vulnerability. One option here is looking at 
levels of child mortality and malnutrition. In most households, children get priority when it 
comes to food, so high levels of child malnutrition is an even surer sign of poverty (Hanlon et 
al. 2010). The Brazilian Bolsa Família, a transfer program directed at households with school-
age children, has brought a 45% reduction in chronic child malnutrition. In South Africa, 
comparing the heights of children born before the introduction of the child benefit grant to the 
height of children born after it show a marked change: the latter category were significantly 
taller than the average, and could expect to be 3,5 centimeters taller as adults. Similar results 
area also found if overall nutrition is investigated: in Mexico, 70% of the households 
participating in the Oportunidades program had improved their nutritional status. 
 While these are all examples of relatively large transfer programs in middle-income 
countries, smaller schemes and countries also show positive nutritional impacts. A pilot 
scheme for a cash transfer directed at the poorest ten percent of households in the Kalomo 
district in Zambia show similar results, where recipients prioritized buying food or other basic 
needs (Schubert 2008). It is clear that upon receiving money through a transfer program, poor 
households highly prioritize food spending, and it seems clear that social protection in 
developing countries would thus serve to better nutrition levels. 
 Better health is also one of the potential consequences related to social transfers. An 
improvement in health is, of course, inextricably tied to better nutrition, as well-fed people are 
less likely to fall ill. This is especially true of children, who, if they are malnourished in 
childhood, can suffer the consequences throughout their lives. However, social transfers can 
also give households the option to visit clinics more often and thus take care of their health 
more than earlier. In situations where money is given on the condition of attending clinics this 
connection is more obvious, such as a Nicaraguan program which saw an increase in the 
immunization levels among recipients by 18%, but this also often holds true in other cases 
(Chapman 2006). Pensioners in South Africa use 40% of their social pension on health 
expenses, and are found to be in significantly better health than their family members in cases 
where the household did not pool their incomes. If the household did pool their money, all 
members’ health statuses were better. Chapman (2006) also cites an example from Honduras, 
where payments to households on the condition that they be used for preventive health 
services was more effective in bringing people to health centers than investing directly in the 
health centers themselves.  
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 Another oft-cited consequence of social transfers relates to the third function of social 
protection as laid out above: strengthening the agency of those in poverty. Giving money to 
the poor necessarily increases their agency relative to other groups, since they now have more 
options as to how they spend their money. Intra-household shifts of power could also occur, 
however, usually connected to the empowerment of women. In the Oportunidades program, 
transfers are mostly received and spent by women, making them feel that they have gained in 
autonomy and power (Hanlon et al. 2010). Another group possibly empowered by social 
transfers is the elderly: with a guaranteed income through a pension scheme they can 
contribute to the household even when they have lost the ability to work. Having their own 
money to spend can also increase their sense of self-worth and confidence, other important 
ways of strengthening agency.  
 In addition to reducing poverty, the potential of social transfers to reducing inequality 
should also be mentioned. Cichon and Scholz (2009) refer to a study showing how, in the 
mid-1990s, tax and transfer systems reduce inequality by between 40% and 50% in countries 
like Belgium, France, Germany and Sweden, and between 20% and 30% in countries 
including the USA, Australia and the UK. Heady et al. (2001), focused on EU countries, 
shows that social transfers specifically targeted at poor groups are strongly redistributive, and 
that more general transfers have little effect on inequality. This bodes well for developing 
countries, since their social protection is dominated by the social assistance component of 
social protection.  
Some reduction of inequality has also been visible in developing countries, 
particularly in Mexico, Brazil and South Africa. In each of these countries, the Gini index has 
fallen by five points in eight years, three points in five years and four points in six years 
respectively (Hanlon et al. 2010). These changes are contested, though, but Hanlon et al. 
(2010) refer to a study claiming that a third of the reduction in Brazil is due to the 
implementation of social transfers. In any case, such wide-reaching consequences could only 
be expected in the countries with expansive social transfer programs, and is unlikely to occur 
in the same scale for those countries with less means and more limited transfer schemes.  
 So far, I have concentrated on the positive consequences of social transfers. It should, 
be reiterated that there is no guarantee for any of these results. As has been discussed already, 
there are a number of constraints connected to implementing social protection schemes in 
poor countries, all of which can serve to undermine potential impacts. If transfers are not fair, 
assured, practical, substantial and/or popular, for instance, they cannot be expected to achieve 
all that they set out to achieve. In some cases, poorly planned transfer schemes can even have 
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negative consequences: Lloyd-Sherlock and Schröder-Butterfill (2008) describes pension 
reforms in Thailand and Indonesia which, instead of leading to a more embracing pension 
system, established unsustainable and inequitable financing structures that favored well-off 
groups instead of the poor. In other cases, a transfer program might simply not meet its goals 
or be more costly than planned, in both cases underlying the need for proper planning and 
proper evaluation. 
 Another possible negative consequence of implementing social transfers is that an 
increase in government activity on this field could lead to a “crowding out” of informal 
transfers, effectively reducing the potential impact of social protection (Barrientos 2010). In 
this way, a government increase in spending could lead to a total decrease in spending, if the 
crowding out-effect is very strong. While this might seem like a bad investment on the surface, 
it could in some cases still lead to an increase in welfare, as informal social protection is 
frequently less effective than government spending. Also, specifically in the case of pensions 
and assuming that informal transfers are, to some degree, based on reciprocity, a formal 
system could offer the recipient of the pension something to offer in exchange for other goods, 
such as general care (Lloyd-Sherlock 2000). This, then, would reinforce existing informal 
transfers, rather than crowding them out. 
Despite the possibilities for some negative consequences, it is clear that social 
protection can reduce poverty. However, for them to do so, they must be both well-planned 
and executed, and often accompanied by broader investments in other sectors of society as 
well. The educational impacts of Oportunidades and Bolsa Família, for instance, would be 
worth little if they were not also accompanied by increases in number of teachers and 
investments in education infrastructure, just as social transfers cannot increase child 
immunization rates if there are no health clinics available (Hanlon et al. 2010). Even 
improved nutrition is dependent on there being a market available from which better or more 
food can be purchased. If social transfers are to have the “transformative” aspect championed 
by Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux (2008) above, broader investments and accompanying 
initiatives are a must. 
Social protection and economic consequences 
So far, I have only examined the potential social transfers have for reducing poverty and 
vulnerability, concentrating on two of Barrientos’ and Hulme’s (2008)  three main purposes 
of social protection. While reducing poverty is important and of significant worth in and of 
itself, it is commonly assumed that for poverty reduction to continue and to increase in pace in 
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the long run, economic growth is of paramount importance. For Barrientos and Hulme (2008), 
the third purpose of social protection deals with facilitating investment in assets so that 
intergenerational poverty can be combated. In this way, social transfers can contribute to 
long-term development by facilitating economic growth, and thus perhaps ensure long-term 
poverty reduction. A cursory look at the world today reveals that the countries with the most 
comprehensive social protection coverage are also the world’s most prosperous countries, but 
the direction of cause and effect must be established: do countries with higher levels of 
economic growth tend to implement and extend social transfers or do countries with 
comprehensive protection schemes experience higher economic growth? 
 For many, it is counterintuitive that an increase in government expenditures on social 
protection will increase economic growth. The common assumption when it comes to high 
taxes and transfers is that they reduce productivity, thus harming economic growth, and 
investing directly in pro-poor growth is therefore thought to be a far more efficient in bringing 
about poverty reduction than an increase in social expenditure. Lindert (2004: 227) 
summarizes – and criticizes – this position well when he says: “It is well known that higher 
taxes and transfers reduce productivity. Well known – but unsupported by statistics and 
history”. Lindert finds that growth levels in developed countries with high social spending are 
equal to the levels found in low-spending countries, with one significant difference between 
the two: growth in the former has been equitable. 
 In the end, Lindert (2004) arrives at an interesting contradiction he calls “the Free-
Lunch Puzzle”, namely that high social spending comes in at a near-zero cost to GDP. How is 
this possible? Lindert finds several factors to explain this puzzle, in sum showing how the 
most generous welfare states have consciously chosen to employ social policies that actively 
promotes growth. This can be illustrated by the fact that the tax burden in these countries, 
while being larger, is geared towards promoting economic growth and the environment, 
giving the same incentives to work as in the less generous welfare states. This shows how 
more universalistic schemes have a lower marginal tax rate and increase poor people’s 
contribution to GDP. 
 There is reason to question how relevant these findings are in the context of this thesis, 
however. Lindert’s (2004) focus is on the fully developed welfare states in the North, and 
most of his points are therefore less relevant in when it comes to the South, where there are 
only limited protection initiatives. Still, his main point stands: that when social transfers 
promote or at least not depress people’s ability and will to work, they can end up having a 
positive influence on GDP, even outweighing the transfers cost to GDP in the first place.  
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The question then becomes in what way social transfers promote productivity in the 
population of developing countries. For one thing, it is obvious that social transfers here give 
fewer disincentives to work in the first place, since most recipients are still in poverty even 
after receiving whatever benefits they are entitled to, owing to the relatively small amounts 
involved. Because of this, social transfers can be expected to have little direct impact on the 
willingness on part of recipients to work, since they are still very much dependent on other 
income sources. In some cases, of course, this could occur, but not at a very large scale. In 
short: giving people money does not promote laziness or dependency (Hanlon et al. 2010).  
 Social transfers do not only do little harm to work incentives in developing countries, 
it can also serve to increase the labor market participation. This is supported by findings from 
both Brazil and South Africa, where labor market participation went up among recipients of 
the different transfers (Hanlon et al. 2010). One way through which this could happen is by 
making households able to afford the costs of migrating or by pension income enabling 
grandmothers to take care of children while parents are out working or seeking work.  
 The productivity of those already employed could also increase, mainly through 
improving the nutritional and health status of the general populace. This is something also 
Lindert (2004) takes into account when he explains the free-lunch puzzle, as he sees public 
health care spending as part of social protection spending. If one assumes that both better 
nutrition and more health care increases longevity, it would also increase productivity, by 
helping workers retain their ability to work even when getting older, and by reducing sick 
leave or absenteeism. This certainly also applies in developing countries, and it has already 
been shown that poor households are likely to spend a fair portion of their benefits on both 
improving their nutrition and visiting health stations more frequently. Another important 
aspect here is that it is cheaper for the state to ensure good nutrition in childhood than it is to 
treat nutrition-related diseases throughout someone’s adult life (Samson 2009). 
While social protection can contribute to growth indirectly by bettering nutrition and 
health, or making participation in the work force possible, it can also contribute more directly 
by increasing economic activity. This can happen through two main channels: first, by 
impacting local markets and second, by encouraging increased saving and investment on part 
of poor people. 
Social transfers can impact local markets in two ways. On the one hand, a social 
transfer can fuel local economies by increasing local demand. On the other, injecting too 
much money into a local market might drive prices up, depending on how isolated that market 
is (Ellis et al. 2009). The positive outcome here, fuelling local markets, is an idea predicated 
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on the fact that poor people spend their money locally on locally produced goods much more 
than the better-off. Samson (2009) shows how, in South Africa, upper-income households 
tend to spend extra income on transportation, often by buying cars, while lower- income 
households spend extra income on food, as has already been shown. Cars are capital-intensive 
and often imported, but food production is labor-intensive and local. When a social transfer 
shifts income from upper-income households to lower-income households, then, there is 
potential for a change in the composition of spending that favors local production. This shift 
in income is related to income inequality, and it was shown above how some developing 
countries have seen a reduction in this area. 
The effect of transfers on local markets is clear in Brazil, where pension payday is a 
significant source of income for local shops, one trader estimating that they would lose 40% 
of their business if the program was stopped (Hanlon et al. 2010). A study of a cash grant in 
one district of Malawi shows that the money given had a local multiplier of more than 2, i.e. 
that each dollar transferred into the area was used at least twice before it left the area (Ellis et 
al. 2009). Increased economic activity like this can support job creation by increasing the 
demand for labor, which further strengthens the local economy. This beneficial spiral is thus a 
potential impact of social transfers. 
There is also a potential downside to injecting money into local economies like this, 
which is causing inflation and driving prices up locally. For one thing, this would risk 
nullifying the value of the transfer in the first place, but it would also put those households 
who are not receiving the transfer at an increased disadvantage. The danger of causing 
inflation is higher when transfers are large compared to local purchasing power, and also 
when the markets in question are highly local or isolated (Ellis et al. 2009). These kinds of 
effect lack firm evidence, but are still a concern that should be taken seriously. 
Encouraging productive investments is the other way social transfers can contribute to 
economic growth. The most obvious way this can happen is through the sheer fact of giving 
money to people who want to invest, but do not have the sufficient funds. Social transfers can 
also provide security to poor people who face a range of shocks (Hanlon et al. 2010). Since a 
cash transfer is something to trust, poorer households may feel that they can take greater 
chances in the way they spend their money, no longer needing to act in risk-averse ways.  
Purchasing farm implements or agricultural inputs or investing in house improvements 
are common examples of productive investments resulting from social transfers. Evidence for 
this can be found in Mexico, for instance, where an agricultural program transferring cash to 
farmers to make up for the impact of NAFTA resulted in a doubling of the value of cash given 
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by buying more of the current inputs (Hanlon et al. 2010). Oportunidades has also resulted in 
a small increase in productive investments by recipient households, largely in cattle, 
machinery or small shops. 
It should also be mentioned that social transfers, apart from leading to productive 
investments, can serve to protect already existing assets (Ellis et al. 2009). Selling off assets 
in order to meet short-term expenses is the kind of risk-averse behavior which is detrimental 
to a household’s long-term outlook. Examples here include selling livestock or taking children 
out of school to work, and if social transfers can help to avoid this kind of behavior, it has 
made an important contribution. Ellis et al. (2009) refer to a cash and food transfer in Malawi, 
which effectively protected household assets from distress sales for survival. 
Rather than investing money, recipients of social transfers can also save money, either 
for larger purchases later or to have money available in case of emergencies. In South Africa, 
a far larger share of transfer recipients has bank accounts than eligible non-recipients, and the 
share with some form of saving is also higher (Hanlon et al. 2010). In Zambia, the Kalomo 
transfer enabled 15% of recipients to save small amounts every month, eventually enabling 
them to purchase livestock (Ellis et al. 2009). 
Another kind of investment, less immediate but still important, is found in building 
human capital, specifically making poor households invest more in education. An increase in 
school enrollment rates is a common consequence of social transfers, especially in Africa 
(Ellis et al. 2009). Again, there are connections here to better nutrition and health, as more 
healthy children are more likely to attend school, but social transfers also directly impact 
educational indicators. Many programs, like Bolsa Família and Oportunidades are specifically 
geared towards this, but even those who are not focused on increasing enrollment find this to 
be a consequence (Hanlon et al. 2010). In South Africa, primary school non-attendance has 
been cut in half, and in Mexico, teenagers covered by Oportunidades are 33% more likely to 
attend secondary education and 23% more likely to complete it. High school attendance rates 
in rural areas has doubled, and made it the norm for poor children to stay in school after 
finishing primary school, rather than the exception. In Bangladesh, a cash-for-education 
program has given a 20-30% increase in primary school enrollment rates and in Nicaragua a 
similar program gave a 22% increase (Chapman 2006). Looking at other indicators than 
enrollment also shows positive outcomes: in Zambia, absenteeism declined by 16% in the first 
nine months of the Kalomo cash transfer scheme. Pensions are also known to increase school 
enrollment and attendance, for instance in South Africa (Case and Deaton 1998). While not 
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immediately contributing to economic growth, investing in education can potentially have 
long-term effects on the economy, by increasing the skill levels present in the population. 
Taken together, it is hoped that these effects on investments, saving and asset 
protection will be able to contribute to a positive spiral of economic activity. Job creation and 
further generation of demand could continue the upward spiral created by the injection of 
money into local economies, and thus extend the beneficial impact of social transfers much 
further than the initial transfer of money to a poor household. In the end, developing countries 
might experience the same effect that developed countries have, namely that social transfers 
come at a near-zero cost to GDP, all effects included. 
Summary 
In this chapter, I have discussed the concept of social protection and examined its application 
in the context of developing countries, discussing the constraints that are faced here as well as 
some of the consequences that have been identified when different social transfers have been 
implemented. Social protection is a contested concept, but can be seen as aiming to protect 
poor people against low living standards and aiding them in fulfilling basic needs. There are 
different components to social protection, but social assistance directed towards the poor is 
most dominant in developing countries, aiming to protect basic consumption, facilitating 
productive investments and strengthening the agency of those in poverty. While developing 
countries face a number of constraints in implementing social transfers, these can be 
overcome in different ways, making them viable even for low-income countries.  
An examination of the potential impacts of social protection show that they can be 
effective in combating poverty and vulnerability, through improving nutrition, bettering 
health status, strengthening agency, encouraging work force participation, stimulating local 
markets or letting households make productive investments or investments in human capital. 
In sum, this paints a promising picture for other developing countries, seeking to implement 
similar policies. 
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4. Old Age in Developing Countries 
While introducing social protection in developing countries seems justified, it is still 
necessary for governments in the South to choose what exactly they should implement. On the 
surface, there seems also to be a clear mandate to introduce pension schemes in developing 
countries. Willmore (2007) estimates that worldwide, formal retirement schemes cover less 
than 15% of the world’s households, and less than 10% of the world’s working age population. 
In contrast to this, the World Bank (1994) estimates that 70% of all elderly people rely 
exclusively on informal transfers, showing that this is by far the dominating approach. I have 
already discussed how these informal transfers are under pressure and that they are ineffective 
or vulnerable on a large scale. 
 Still, the case for introducing pension schemes, rather than some other form of social 
protection, is more complex than the fact that they are currently not in place. It is clear that 
there is a great deal of variation within the category of social protection, and equally clear that 
resource constraints are in play, limiting the viable options for poorer countries. Because of 
this, developing countries are forced to prioritize between different options, all of which 
might be desirable, often choosing to aid one vulnerable group over another. The question 
then becomes: why the elderly? 
Of course, the answer to this question must ultimately be found in the national context 
of each social transfer, incorporating different financial, political and administrative concerns, 
but it is also possible to make some overarching observations, justifying attention to the 
elderly on a general level. In development policy, the elderly have been – and are still – an 
under-prioritized group, making this point all the more important. In this chapter, I will 
explore different reasons for focusing more on the elderly and also why the introduction of 
pension schemes can be a good option for many developing countries. Two main topics will 
be explored: the fact that the world is ageing and the living situation of older people in the 
developing world. In the end, I will look at what consequences can be identified from the 
pension scheme in South Africa, providing further clues for what to expect from the Lesotho 
old-age pension. 
Who are the elderly? 
Before going into those topics, however, I will clarify the term “elderly”. So far, I have been 
using the terms “the elderly” or “older people” without exploring the contents of them. While 
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everyone has an intuitive understanding of what an old person is, there are some issues that 
should be clarified. 
In Europe and the USA, it is common practice to utilize chronological age in deciding 
where the threshold for old age is, usually set to 60 or 65 years (Anthony 2010). Furthermore, 
it is possible to divide the group of elderly in different ways, for instance into the “young old” 
(65-75 years), the “old-old” (75-85 years) and the “oldest-old” (85+ years). Such designations, 
or variations on them, form the basis for most statistics and consequently policy choices made 
in matters pertaining to a society’s old.  
Using this chronological definition of old age makes sense in a daily-life setting, but 
can be quite inaccurate. Evans (2003) uses a “true ageing”-approach to understanding the 
ageing process. Because true ageing is primarily a result of genetic and lifestyle factors, it is 
necessarily a process that is unique to the individual, and the variation between older people 
who are chronologically the same age can be enormous. The individual nature of biological 
ageing and physical decline means that chronological definitions are a somewhat random 
method of deciding who are old and who are not. This understanding also goes against 
viewing old age as a distinct life stage, since there is so much variation within the group. 
Furthermore, and looking past differences in physical functioning, the experience of 
ageing is also important. This experience is affected by both personal and cultural factors. 
Two individuals going through the same physical decline (e.g. loss of eyesight) might feel 
very differently about it, as one might feel that he is now helpless while the other might feel 
only inconvenienced (Eyetsemitan 2007). This could both be related to that person’s 
experience and expectation of getting older and to broader cultural factors: the first could live 
in a society that values independence and the other in one that is more communal. Culture 
thus plays an important role in “deciding” who is old and what their quality of life is. In light 
of this, exclusively using chronological age as the determinant in deciding old age seems 
inappropriate. Evans (2003: 19) puts it strongly: “Age is a number derived from a birth 
certificate and cannot be a cause of anything (apart from prejudice)”.  
All things considered, chronological age seems like an arbitrary threshold. 
Nevertheless, accepting that ageing is an individual process and recognizing the problems 
related to chronological definitions does not set aside the need for having an agreed-upon 
definition, especially for purposes of academic studies and policy. Even if chronological age 
is arbitrary, it is necessary when it comes to producing statistics, where a holistic 
understanding of old age would be very difficult to use. As mentioned, developed countries 
usually use 60 or 65 years as their threshold for old age, even if it is somewhat arbitrary. 
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Likewise, in most of the developing world, each country’s official “old age” is set around 65 
years, usually corresponding to the pension age (Anthony 2010). The United Nations does not 
operate with an official standard on this, but the commonly agreed-upon threshold is 60 
years,
5
 which is also the basis for the population statistics released by the UNPD. 
For the purposes of this thesis, I will continue to use the United Nations definition of 
an older person as being 60 or over. In addition, because the Lesotho pension scheme has set 
the qualifying age at 70 years, all of my informants are aged 70 or over. Still, it is important to 
keep the above points in mind, and realize that two pensioners sharing the same age can have 
wildly differing life situations.  
An ageing world 
There are large regional differences in ageing processes, but the global trend is still clear: the 
global population is ageing. While this has been a recognized phenomenon in the developed 
world for some time, the ageing process taking place in the developing world has not gotten 
the same amount of attention. Before turning to this, it is a good idea to get a general picture 
of global population dynamics. The 2008 Revision, published by the United Nations 
Population Division (UNPD), builds on the round of national population censuses undertaken 
in 2000, as well as former revisions. Here, the world population is estimated to grow past 9 
billion
6
 by 2050 (UNPD 2009). Most of this population increase will take place in developing 
countries, which is estimated to have a total of 7,9 billion inhabitants in 2050, or 86% of the 
world’s population. The most rapid growth is found in the 49 LDCs. 
 The population in developing countries is currently rather young, with the numbers of 
both children and young people being at an all time high, but the population aged 60 or over is 
the fastest growing population segment (UNPD 2009). While this segment is expected to 
increase by more than 50% in developed regions, reaching 416 million, the numbers of older 
people in developing regions are estimated to more than triple, rising from 473 million in 
2009 to 1,6 billion in 2050. This strong ageing tendency can also be illustrated by looking at 
the global median age, which is projected to increase from 29 years in 2009 to 38 years in 
2050. Forty-three developing countries will have a median age above 40. To set this increase 
in perspective, the preceding half century saw the median age rise by less than 3 years, while 
the current half century will see a rise of more than 11 years (UNPD 2002).  
                                                          
5
 http://www.who.int/healthinfo/survey/ageingdefnolder/en/index.html [accessed 09.02.12] 
6
 This number, as well as all the following numbers, refers to the medium variant of the UNPDs projections. 
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By examining the proportion of the population that is made up by the elderly, the 
ageing trend becomes even clearer. Today, people aged 60 or over make up around 8% of the 
total population in the developing world. This percentage is expected to more than double, 
reaching 20% in 2050 (UNPD 2009). If this group is broken down into smaller segments, it 
shows that the number of persons aged 80 or over is projected to quadruple, making the so-
called “oldest old” the fastest growing segment of world population. In total, 79% of those 
aged 60 or above will live in developing countries, showing the tremendous challenge that lies 
in wait for old age care in the South. 
The reasons for the global ageing trend are quite complex, and will only be touched on 
briefly here. The main driving factor is declining fertility in developing countries (UNPD 
2009). On a global basis, fertility is expected to drop from the current 2,6 children per woman 
to 2,0 in 2045-2050. The decline is much steeper in the LDCs, where the projected drop is 
from 4,4 children per woman to 2,4. Another contributing factor is increasing longevity. The 
global life expectancy is expected to rise from 68 years to 76 in 2045-2050. In the developing 
world, the average life expectancy will be 74 years, and even the LDC average is estimated at 
69 years, up from 56 years today. Together, decreasing fertility and increasing longevity 
contribute significantly to the ageing population. 
 It should be noted that these numbers are simply estimates, and that they cannot be 
taken as truths, especially because they try to look 40 years into the future. A central 
assumption underlying the expected increase in longevity, for example, is that there is an 
increase in treatment of those suffering from HIV/AIDS. This is especially the case in the 
LDCs, where the incidence of HIV/AIDS is the highest. Thus, longevity depends on 
antiretroviral therapy being made available to those infected at a continuingly higher rate, as 
well as the promotion of preventive measures (UNPD 2009). A fall in fertility rates also 
depends on different factors, such as further economic development and access to family 
planning, both of which are uncertain.  
 Still, it is apparent that the world population is ageing, which puts pensions on the 
agenda in and of itself. The fact that the population of elderly people will increase many-fold 
means that national and international development policy must begin to focus more explicitly 
on this group, since they will comprise a larger and larger share of the population. This is 
especially true when considering the lack of social protection coverage this group faces if 
more initiatives are not taken. Thus, the role for social protection in the form of pensions is of 
increasing importance. 
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 Of course, all the regions of the world will not experience the ageing process equally. 
There are obvious differences between the developed and developing world, but there are also 
differences within the developing world. Specifically, the ageing trend is at its weakest in 
Africa. Africa remains the youngest continent even in 2050 and the estimated average life 
expectancy in 2050 is 9 years lower than in Asia, the second lowest one (UNPD 2009). It is 
also in Africa that we find most of the LDCs and consequently the highest rates of fertility 
and the highest incidence of HIV/AIDS, both of which might significantly counteract the 
ageing trend. Using Lesotho as an example, as it is both an LDC and has a high incidence of 
HIV/AIDS, the country has the fourth lowest life expectancy of all countries in the 2009 
revision, at 45,3 years. A further consequence of the high incidence of HIV/AIDS is that the 
2050 population is projected to be 19% lower than it would have been without the pandemic 
(UNPD 2002). This reduces population pressures, and counteracts the ageing process that has 
been identified in many other parts of the world. In Lesotho, the proportion of the population 
aged 60 or over will increase from 7,7% to 10,2%, a much lower increase than otherwise in 
the developing world. The median age is expected to stay low, at 26,8 years in 2050, and the 
estimated life expectancy in 2050 is the lowest of all countries, at 56,3 years. 
Thus, one can hardly say that Lesotho will go through a significant ageing process, 
like many other developing countries, which could appear to undermine the need for a 
pension scheme here. Still, I would argue that the pension scheme in Lesotho is important, 
both for the country’s inhabitants and as an example for other developing countries. Since the 
developing world will go through an ageing process, it is important to focus on pension 
schemes in many different national settings, in order to see what lessons can be learned from 
them and how these lessons can be applied in a broader context. In addition, there are only 
two LDCs that have established some sort of non-contributory pension scheme, making 
Lesotho even more interesting (the other is Nepal). As has been shown, ageing will take place 
also in LDCs, and the elderly will become a more prominent part of the population even here. 
Furthermore, there is also an argument related to ethics, in that even if the elderly do not 
comprise a large part of the population, they may often live in poverty, and increasing their 
welfare should be a priority in and of itself. Issues connected to the living situations and well-
being of the elderly in developing countries will now be explored further. 
Old People’s Living Situation in the Developing World 
While the global ageing process could be expected to put this issue more firmly on the agenda, 
especially for those who are working towards reducing overall poverty, a stronger focus has 
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not materialized (Heslop 1999). Instead, having an ageing population has been seen as a threat 
to development, just as old people themselves are seen as burdens to society, perceptions 
which stand in the way of measures aiming to improve their quality of life. In this view, older 
people are thought to contribute less and cost more than other members of society, in terms of 
lower productivity and increased health care costs. Ageing populations would be expected to 
reinforce these problems, exposing governments all over the world to significant costs. It is 
thus easy to be bogged down in negativity when discussing the ageing world, which in itself 
forms another obstacle to policy initiatives. 
 Countering this way of thinking is Barrientos et al. (2003), who argue that older 
people’s contribution to society is continually undervalued. This undervaluation also 
marginalizes the elderly from development thinking and policy. Since the latter has often been 
focused on economic growth and increased productivity, the “inefficient” elderly have been 
rendered irrelevant to achieving development, and thus not a priority (Gorman 1999). This is 
especially problematic when considering the increasing number of old people in the world. 
Another consequence of the undervaluation of older people is a lacking understanding of old 
age poverty (Heslop 1999). In the following, I will outline what is known about old age 
poverty, and then underline the role the elderly play in their households and communities, so 
as not to take an exclusively negative outlook on old age.  
Old age poverty 
Are older people poorer than other segments of the population? It is here important to 
remember two things: first, and as already mentioned, our understanding of old age poverty is 
lacking. This is especially true in Africa. A WHO report from a workshop aiming to establish 
a minimum data set on the living conditions of the elderly in Africa, states that “information 
on older adults currently collected by routine sources throughout the African Continent is 
fragmented, incomplete or not specific to older populations” (WHO 2000: 9). One example of 
this is the lack of mortality, morbidity or risk factor measures on older populations, even 
though these are readily available for other vulnerable groups, such as children or pregnant 
women. This lack of information is important to remember in any discussion on the life 
situations of the elderly. 
 The second important factor is that the incidence of poverty among older people is 
necessarily connected to that among the general population, as well as to the given country’s 
organizational structure and whatever poverty reducing efforts they have going (ECLAC 
2004). This means that a country where the incidence of poverty is high is more likely to have 
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a high incidence of poverty among the elderly as well. Still, there could be cases where a 
higher proportion of the elderly are poor than other age groups. 
 For some clue of the extent of old age poverty, I first turn to quantitative studies.. 
Barrientos et al. (2003) look at what we know from household survey data about old age 
poverty by summing up the evidence from three different studies on the topic. These three 
studies investigate different settings: the first deals with a range of developing countries; the 
second with urban old age poverty in Latin American countries; and the third with old age 
poverty in transition economies. There are many problems connected to this method of cross-
study comparison, as different poverty studies are not necessarily comparable. Still, it 
provides a rough overview: While variations are large both within and between the studies, in 
one study ranging from 7,5% (in Taiwan) to 64% (in Ghana) and in another from 9,8% (in 
Chile) to 69,9% (in Honduras), it shows that old age poverty is indeed common in many 
countries, but that levels vary a lot. 
The highest old age poverty rates are, however, found in the countries with the highest 
overall poverty rates, which is unsurprising. Thus it is still hard to say how old age poverty 
compares to poverty among other groups. Barrientos et al. (2003) examine this question by 
first comparing headcount poverty measures among the elderly to that of the general 
population and then comparing poverty among the elderly to poverty among the young. The 
comparison of headcount measures confirms that the rate of poverty in old age largely reflects 
the aggregate poverty rate, except for in a few cases. Comparing poverty among the old and 
the young shows that poverty is higher among the young in all the developed countries 
included in the sample. In sum, this seems to suggest that the elderly are not particularly 
vulnerable to poverty, at least not more so than the population at large, which in turn points 
away from the necessity of directing special attention or assistance towards the elderly. 
There are, however, several weaknesses connected to using household measures of 
poverty when it comes to estimating old age poverty. For one thing, household measures 
overlook the fact that the needs of older people are different than those of younger 
populations (ECLAC 2004). Also, because most elderly people live in smaller households, 
and because household surveys usually discount economies of size in household consumption, 
the surveys tend to overestimate the well-being of elderly as well as underestimate the well-
being of another vulnerable group, namely children, who more often live in households with 
more members (Deaton and Paxson 1997). If one allows for the lower cost of children and/or 
economies of scale, the position of the elderly worsens relative to children. Indeed, Deaton 
and Paxson (1997: 23) conclude that, compared to child poverty rates, “higher poverty rates 
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among the elderly is the more common case, so that the contrary finding based on [per capita 
household expenditure] is seriously misleading”. 
So, while an aggregate look at old age poverty downplays its relative importance, 
there are definite problems with such an approach. This shows the usefulness of also 
considering qualitative approaches to understanding old age poverty, instead of relying solely 
on quantitative data. This is further supported by Lloyd-Sherlock (2010), who points out how 
income is a poor measurement of life quality, especially in old age, since other issues, e.g. 
health complications, has an even stronger bearing on older people’s well-being.  
Barrientos et al. (2003) consider qualitative evidence of old age poverty from several 
different sources and find that there is considerable uniformity in older people’s experiences 
with poverty across different settings. This suggests something universal when it comes to old 
age poverty. Kidd and Whitehouse (2009) emphasize the fact that the elderly are a vulnerable 
group, and that they grow more vulnerable as they age. This manifests itself through the 
increasing chance of falling ill or becoming disabled. In one survey from India, 45% of older 
people had chronic illnesses, and in another, 90% had visual deficits, 40% muscular-skeletal 
problems and 20% had cardiovascular problems (Kalache and Sen 1999). Debilitating 
diseases can clearly cause someone to fall into poverty, or worsen already existing poverty.  
There is also a distinctly psychological side to vulnerability. Heslop (1999) sees 
isolation, powerlessness and low self-esteem as aspects of vulnerability inextricably linked to 
old age. Many older people become isolated because they have less access to communication 
technologies and because they are dependent on public transportation, which is often costly or 
inaccessible for other reasons (Fredman 2003). Factors such as these are often overlooked in 
income-focused poverty surveys, but still play a very important role in determining who is 
poor and who is not poor. This also shows how non-poor households can contain poor old 
people, if a broader understanding of poverty is utilized.  
Another, more obvious, source of vulnerability for the elderly is that they are 
gradually losing the capability to work. This is of course connected to failing health, 
especially the loss of physical strength, often the only asset available to poor individuals 
(Heslop and Gorman 2002). When losing the ability to support themselves based on current 
earnings, and in the absence of protection schemes, older people become dependent on laying 
claim on resources in other ways, usually through family transfers and informal social 
protection (World Bank 1994). It should be mentioned that a reduced capacity to perform 
work does not mean that older people do not work at all, a point which will be explored below.
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The fact that older people become more dependent on support networks is another 
important aspect of old age poverty and vulnerability. As shown above, a large share of the 
elderly relies solely on informal support networks, usually centered on the family. The 
pressure these networks are under is obvious also in the case of the elderly. As economies 
grow to be more centered on cities, the importance of agriculture diminishes, which leads to 
fewer work opportunities for the elderly and causes younger generations to move to urban 
areas to get jobs (World Bank 1994). This increase in migration reduces the social pressure 
for supporting one’s parents and undermines the norm that children should live with their 
parents to care for them properly. On top of these processes comes the increase in longevity, 
which puts the whole informal system under even more pressure. Additionally, if an older 
person does not have living children, e.g. due to war, disease or migration, he is even more 
vulnerable to chronic poverty (Heslop and Gorman 2002).  
While the increased vulnerability experienced by the elderly can be said to be 
intrinsically linked to ageing, and therefore a universal experience, there are also local factors 
in play. In Southern Africa, HIV/AIDS greatly affects the well-being of older people. The 
pandemic has created a gap in the population of working-age individuals, leaving many 
orphans to be cared for by their grandparents (Nhongo 2004). Additionally, those who are 
sick or dying from the disease often return to their parents’ home when they can no longer 
care for themselves. The burden of caring for one’s dying children is significant in material 
terms, but also physically and mentally. Caring for sick relatives can also result in missing 
work in the fields or other work opportunities, further exacerbating the position for the elderly. 
In caring for orphaned grandchildren, the cost of food, clothes and education becomes major 
concern for the elderly, especially if they have no other family members to turn to. There is no 
doubt that HIV/AIDS has significantly contributed to the burden of the elderly in the most 
heavily affected countries. 
Going deeper into the causes of old age poverty, Heslop (1999) argues that the 
exclusion and impoverishment of old people is the result of structural inequalities. 
Throughout life, inequalities affect a person’s well-being, e.g. in education, employment and 
health care, and these are reinforced in old age. Older people are more often excluded from 
decision-making processes, have worse access to public services, support systems and even to 
development initiatives such as micro credit schemes. Often, where access to health services 
or education is free, older people fail to utilize them because they lack information. All of this 
serves to reinforce the vulnerability of older people described in this section, and contribute to 
their poverty. This sort of age discrimination is not limited to developing countries, but is 
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rather a feature of old age in most societies (Fredman 2003). While this form of 
discrimination has long been accepted as natural, it has now become part of the greater 
equality agenda in developed countries, alongside long-standing equality issues such as race 
or gender. This has not happened to the same degree in developing countries, however. 
 While I hitherto have been using terms like “the elderly” or “older people”, it should 
be made clear that there can be significant differences within this group as well. Saying that 
all elderly in developing countries are poor would be an exaggeration, and I have already 
discussed how different people experience ageing differently, reducing the impact of certain 
vulnerability aspects for some. Other elderly are more vulnerable to poverty, for differing 
reasons. Kidd and Whitehouse (2009) describe three kinds of households more vulnerable 
than others: elderly-headed households containing children, especially if there are no adults 
present; households only containing older people; and older women living alone. These 
differences give rise to inequalities also among the elderly poor. 
 In sum, it seems that while the quantitative data does not support the idea that the 
elderly need more attention in development policy, a closer look at the life situations of the 
elderly argue for it. In fact, different dimensions of poverty are so strongly associated with 
age that many communities use age as an indicator of poverty in itself, and the poor 
themselves often point to the elderly as the poorest of the poor (Heslop 1999). The increasing 
vulnerability connected to ageing severely impacts the life quality of older people, and makes 
their situation very precarious. Their reliance on informal support mechanisms makes them 
even more vulnerable, especially when these are under pressure. In this light, the role of 
pensions is obvious, as it can serve to protect the elderly from falling into poverty. 
Contributions of the elderly 
The above section makes it clear that old age poverty is a real phenomenon with significant 
consequences for the elderly. As mentioned initially, however, it is important not to be 
bogged down in negativity when discussing ageing and it is equally important not to paint old 
people as passive victims to the scourge of structural inequality and the ageing process. By 
highlighting the contribution made by the elderly, it is also easier to see how an effort to aid 
the elderly could result in positive consequences for other population groups, and possibly 
have a larger developmental effect than simply being about humanitarian aid to a single 
vulnerable group. 
 It is clear that the role of older people has changed considerably during the last century. 
Traditionally, older people have had the role of guiding and advising the younger population 
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(Nhongo 2004). They were thus seen as custodians of tradition and cultural practices, being 
required to pass this knowledge on to the next generation, in a form of relay race. Kidd and 
Whitehouse (2009: 45) warn against seeing the past as a “golden age when older people were 
taken care of and held in great respect”, as there is little empirical evidence for this. Still, 
there is little doubt that the roles of older people have changed, and that previous traditions 
have become muddled with economic development, as new institutions took on their roles, 
and all-consuming importance was put on economic progress (Nhongo 2004). In the end, 
older people have been marked as economically unproductive and as burdens to society. 
 Such a perception is wrong, however, and it is clear that the elderly contribute 
significantly, even with a purely economical outlook. As touched upon above, the fact that 
older people have reduced work capacities does not mean that they stop working altogether. 
According to one source, in the poorest countries 70% of men and 35% of women aged above 
60 are engaged in work outside the home (Kidd and Whitehouse 2009). Since the elderly are 
often employed in the informal sector, however, there is an amount of uncertainty connected 
to these numbers, which could be even higher. 
 In the informal sector, the elderly often attain the least desirable jobs,  and are paid 
less than younger workers (Kidd and Whitehouse 2009). They are also often involved in 
manual labor, and their earnings and status can be expected to decline as their ability to 
perform this labor degrades with age (Lloyd-Sherlock 2000). However, many elderly are 
found working on family small-holdings where their status is higher. A study from rural 
Tanzania showed that while on-farm working hours fell sharply between the ages of 60 and 
90, even over-80 year olds still averaged over two hours of work daily (Heslop and Gorman 
2002). Together, old people’s activities in both of these sectors show that they are capable of 
working and that they maintain employment even in later life. 
 It should be noted that there is a definite and identifiable drop-off in work rates for the 
old-old and the oldest-old (Kidd and Whitehouse 2009). This is not surprising, given the 
many constraints the elderly face in staying employed, which include diminished physical 
strength, poor health and lack of education or training opportunities (Heslop 1999). Still, 
Lloyd-Sherlock (2000) attributes this drop-off largely to the reduced opportunities for work, 
emphasizing that the elderly still wish to work. In the context of widespread poverty and no 
other source of income, such a wish is natural, even in the face of severe constraints. 
 In addition to still seeking employment where possible, the elderly also play a 
significant role in performing household tasks, such as cleaning and childcare (Lloyd-
Sherlock 2000). This has the effect of releasing other household members to gain employment 
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and is thus very valuable. Also, if there is a pension scheme in place, older people tend to 
share their pensions with the household rather than keeping it for their own consumption 
(Lloyd-Sherlock 2010). In this way, the elderly contribute economically to the household 
even when they are not employed, further showing how departure from the labor force cannot 
be equated with no longer being active contributors to society (Fredman 2003). 
Of the household duties performed by the elderly, childcare deserves special mention. 
As mentioned above, the HIV/AIDS pandemic has greatly affected the elderly and changed 
their roles. They are now in the position of having to care for others in the phase of their lives 
where they could reasonably expect that others would care for them (Tanga 2008). HIV/AIDS 
has thus served to highlight the contribution older people make to society in a clearer way 
than before. Of course, the fact that old people take part in the upbringing of their 
grandchildren should not be thought of as a new phenomenon, as this has root in tradition: 
childcare provided by the elderly can be said to be at the heart of the reciprocal relationship 
whereby older people receive care from their families (Nhongo 2004). The current scope of 
the phenomenon now is, however, unprecedented, and because many of the grandchildren are 
orphans there is no longer any reciprocal relationship or a resulting surge in household 
income. In short, the elderly are now primary caregivers. 
From this, it is apparent that the elderly do indeed contribute both to their households 
and to society in general, and that the view of them as unproductive and dependent is 
inaccurate. Of course, the ability of older people to contribute depends on the individual’s 
health status, but their motivations cannot be questioned. Thinking of the elderly as a 
contributing and productive part of society is an important step towards reducing poverty and 
vulnerability for this age group, and it increases the attractiveness of pension schemes. 
Pension schemes  
The effect pension schemes can have on the well-being of the elderly is often assumed to be 
strong and obvious, but Lloyd-Sherlock (2010) claims that this is a common 
misunderstanding regarding pension schemes. Each individual pension scheme needs to be 
designed with care and evaluated properly, in order to ensure beneficial consequences. This 
entails a thorough understanding of the characteristics of different pension schemes. 
As discussed earlier, social security schemes can be divided into social insurance and 
social assistance. This dividing line can also serve to illustrate the key distinction between two 
different kinds of pension schemes, namely contributory and non-contributory ones. 
Contributory pensions are a form of social insurance, where workers are legally obligated to 
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participate by contributing part of their salaries in return for pension benefits when they reach 
the age of retirement (Lloyd-Sherlock 2010). Non-contributory pensions, on the other hand, 
are funded by the state through taxation and are not limited to particular occupational groups, 
but aimed at those who are not covered by social insurance schemes. Since such uncovered 
group usually are the most vulnerable, non-contributory pension schemes have a strong 
poverty reduction focus, and are sometimes called social pensions (Barrientos 2009).  
There are many issues related to contributory pension schemes, but since the topic of 
this thesis is the non-contributory pension scheme in Lesotho, and because contributory 
schemes play less of a role in most developing countries, I will not go further into these.  
The main issues connected to non-contributory are deciding the level of benefits and who are 
entitled to receive them (Lloyd-Sherlock 2010). For both issues, the specific circumstances in 
the implementing country must be taken into account, as there are no absolutes here. I have 
already discussed how the amount of money given through social transfers can be used to 
limit program costs, but this must be balanced by the need to make social transfers substantial, 
so that they are capable of achieving their goals, or be “large enough to cause a real change in 
behavior” (Hanlon et al. 2010: 178). 
When deciding who are entitled to receive the pension, the main question is of course 
setting an appropriate age limit. As was discussed above, there is no absolute threshold here, 
and different concerns come into play, e.g. demographics and resource constraints. This plays 
into the earlier discussion on targeting, as the age of eligibility has a strong bearing on the 
cost of the scheme (Schwarz 2003). Setting the age limit too low might threaten the financial 
feasibility of the pension scheme, but too high of an age limit may be seen as unfair by the 
populace, in addition to limiting the pension’s impact on poverty and vulnerability. Whether 
or not to include a means-test also has to be decided. There is no absolute answer here, and in 
the end, it all comes down to the resources available, the national or regional context and the 
political climate.  
Another issue surrounding pension schemes is their legal status. If the pensions are 
seen as charity on part of the government, rather than a legally (constitutionally) guaranteed 
right, the scheme can be changed or even disbanded at will, and is thus an important issue 
(Lloyd-Sherlock 2010). This touches on the rights-based approach to social protection, but it 
also has important practical consequences. If a pension scheme is thought to be temporary or 
not reliable, it could affect the way recipients spend the money. 
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A history of pension schemes 
There have been a number of policy shifts in the pension agenda since its inception in the 19th 
century. A brief historical overview of these can serve to inform the later discussion on 
today’s pension schemes in the developing world. 
The first national pension scheme was established in Germany in 1889 (Lloyd-
Sherlock 2010). This pension was mainly based on compulsory worker contribution and 
directed towards factory workers, and the age of eligibility was set at 70. Lindert (2004) 
points out that there was very little actual redistribution in the program, because most of the 
funds came directly from workers. Additionally, the coverage was very low, and the pension 
was not motivated by a wish to increase equality or decrease poverty, but rather to stabilize 
the working class and gain political support there (Lloyd-Sherlock 2010). Despite these 
drawbacks, an example was set through the German pension scheme that spread to other 
European countries, and each country’s pension scheme grew from selective coverage of 
specific groups to broad and eventually universal pension coverage.  
 From Europe, pension schemes spread around the world. Lloyd-Sherlock (2010) 
divides the globalization of pension schemes into three pathways, represented in different 
regions. In Africa and Asia, a limited approach was taken, mainly extending pension benefits 
to civil servants and the military. In Latin America, pensions were provided for the whole of 
the formal economy, separating different groups of workers. Lastly, socialist countries took a 
centralized approach, unifying separate worker groups into one, all-embracing and state-
financed pension scheme. Of course, this must be understood as a general overview, as there 
were exceptions in each category. 
 This overview shows that while the approach differed, most developing countries 
chose to implement contributory schemes. There is good reason to question this, mainly 
because of the failure of developing economies to formalize and the consequent failure of 
extending the pension benefits to more than a select few (Palacios and Sluchynsky 2006). 
This stands in contrast to what happened in the European countries, and shows how modeling 
social protection after examples from the North can be inappropriate in developing countries, 
where conditions are very different. 
 A crisis in pension financing and worries about the impending “old-age crisis” brought 
about pension reforms (Lloyd-Sherlock 2010). These were led by the World Bank, who 
started promoting the “Three Pillar Model”, in a mixture of private and public measures 
(World Bank 1994). While this approach did include social pensions, it was still mainly 
focused on contributory schemes, and thus did little to counter the low pension coverage in 
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developing countries. As time passed, however, the three-pillar model petered out, due to a 
variety of reasons, a new reform agenda started to become popular. This was centered on non-
contributory or social pension schemes to aid the poorest old people. Currently, a significant 
portion of middle-income countries and a few low-income countries have social pensions in 
place, clustered in three regions: Latin America, southern Africa and South Asia (Barrientos 
2009). With its non-contributory pension scheme, Lesotho clearly belongs to this category of 
pensions, and is thus an example of this new approach to reducing poverty and vulnerability 
among the elderly, by directing pension specifically to the poor. 
The pension scheme in South Africa 
Before examining the case of Lesotho, it is informative to take a look at already existing 
pension schemes in order to see what consequences can be expected. As I have already 
touched upon, South Africa has one of the most comprehensive social pension schemes in the 
developing world, and its geographical and cultural proximity to Lesotho makes a comparison 
relevant. Of course, there are many differences in the political context and the economic 
outlooks for the two countries, but the consequences from the South African pension scheme 
could be expected to have relevance also in the context of Lesotho. This section will thus 
concentrate on the South African pension scheme. I have already examined the consequences 
of social protection in general, but I will here try to identify those consequences that are 
specific to pension schemes, to have a better understanding of these. 
South Africa was the first country in Africa to initiate a state pension, although it was 
originally limited to white or coloreds only (Pelham 2007). Black South Africans were 
allowed to receive a significantly reduced amount in 1944, and full equality was introduced in 
1993, after the end of apartheid. In order to qualify for the pension, women over the age of 60 
and men over 65 must take a means test, which takes income, assets and marital status into 
account. The amount given changes every year, but from April 1
st
, 2011, the amount was 
R1140
7
 ($168)
 8
. In 2009, the pension provided an estimated 2,3 million recipients with 
benefits, constituting the largest social transfer in South Africa (Hanlon et al. 2010).  
A thorough examination of the South African pension is provided by Case and Deaton 
(1998), who look at both how the pension came about politically and investigate the 
redistributive consequences of the transfer, especially concentrating on household spending 
on food, schooling, transfers and schooling in four different categories of households: African, 
Coloreds, White and Indian. 
                                                          
7
 http://www.westerncape.gov.za/eng/directories/services/11586/47491 [accessed 20.03.12] 
8
 http://www.exchangerates.org.uk/ZAR-USD-20_04_2011-exchange-rate-history.html [accessed 14.05.12] 
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The findings in Case and Deaton (1998) show that the pension constitutes a significant 
part of household income, especially for African households. The most important sources of 
income for these households are formal sector employment and the social pension, and for 
African households with at least one pensioner the pension grant represented 62% of the total 
income of that household. For non-pensioner households, the corresponding figure was 13%. 
Considering that the total income for pensioner and non-pensioner households is the same, 
this shows the importance of the pension benefits as the main source of income for pensioners, 
and gives a clue as to its significance.  
The effects of the pension on income distribution are also interesting. Case and Deaton 
(1998) show a marked effect on income distribution, where households are shifted from the 
lower end towards the middle, reducing poverty and inequality in the process. By their 
estimate, the incidence of poverty among African households would rise from 35% to 40% if 
the pension scheme was removed. This shows that pensions are also capable of affecting 
inequality levels. 
Another interesting finding is that households with pension income have more 
children than the average: 2,3 compared to 1,7 (Case and Deaton 1998). This is only found in 
African households, and the opposite is true for the other three categories. African households 
form the by far largest share of households who receive the pension in the first place, and 
together these two facts show that the pension potentially reaches the young as well as the 
elderly, in other words two vulnerable groups at once. Additionally, since these forms of co-
residence are more common with poorer households, the pension disproportionately reaches 
children living in poverty. This shows how pension schemes are not necessarily limited to 
helping the elderly, but can also potentially reach other vulnerable group.  
 Duflo (2003) takes a closer look at the nutritional impact of pension receipt for 
grandchildren, and focuses especially on whether there are identifiable differences in this 
impact according to the gender of the recipient. She does this by comparing children’s weight 
for height in households with a female pensioner, households with a male pensioner and 
households with no pensioners. The results suggest that when the pension recipient is female, 
there is an increase in the weight for height of girls, but not of boys. For male pension 
recipients, there is no difference in weight for height of either girls or boys. The same result 
holds when also examining height for age. In addition to demonstrating that pensions can 
affect the nutritional status of children, Duflo’s article also raises question of targeting, 
especially whether pensions or cash transfer schemes in general should be targeted towards 
those groups who ultimately produces the best results in some category.  
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The conclusions in both Case and Deaton (1998) and Duflo (2003) are supported by a 
report produced by HelpAge (2003), which is a comparative study of the non-contributory 
pensions in South African Brazil. In addition to stating that pensions have a large impact on 
poverty and that it is shared intra-household, this report also concludes that there has been a 
reduction in household vulnerability, a promotion of the functionings of older people and that 
a large number of recipients have been reached. The sustainability and broad political 
acceptance of the scheme is also underlined. The report also suggests that extending or 
implementing pension schemes in other developing countries could lead to similar 
consequences there. 
 The identified consequences of the South African pension scheme are largely in line 
with the ones predicted in the previous chapter on social protection, but it is worth underlining 
the degree to which the pension is shared with others and spent as household income, 
reaching the large amount of children living in pensioner households and impacting their lives 
as well. The South African pension is thus shown to reach two vulnerable groups, an 
important advantage for the pension as a social transfer. 
Summary 
In this chapter, I have looked closer at the living situations of older people in developing 
countries. It was first noted that there is no definite threshold for “old age”, and many 
drawbacks to simply using chronological age to distinguish who the elderly are. I then moved 
on to show how the world population is ageing, much of this process taking place in the 
developing world. This is especially disconcerting when considered alongside old age poverty. 
While quantitative measures of old age poverty often finds it to be lower or equal to national 
poverty, a closer examination of the topic reveals that many elderly do live in poverty, and 
that their poverty is different than that of other groups, especially characterized by increasing 
vulnerability. Still, seeing the elderly simply as an impoverished and vulnerable group is 
inaccurate, as they still contribute much to society, e.g. through child care.  
Together, the living situation of the elderly calls for social protection initiatives, 
especially pension. I discussed how non-contributory pensions have to solve issues connected 
to eligibility as well as setting an appropriate amount. To exemplify a pension scheme, I 
looked at the South African non-contributory pension, identifying its primary consequences. 
The results from here show that pensions can impact poverty and that they reach more groups 
than the elderly. 
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5. Methodology 
In order to answer the question laid out in the introduction, it was necessary to conduct a 
fieldwork among pensioners in Lesotho. This was undertaken in a six-week period spanning 
April and May 2011.  
In my fieldwork, I chose to take a qualitative approach. There were two main factors 
behind this choice. First was the simple fact that I have more experience and training in 
qualitative techniques. This factor was reinforced by the time and resource constraints 
associated with my fieldwork. Quantitative techniques are often more time consuming, and 
the period of six weeks I had available for the fieldwork would not have been enough time to 
complete a detailed survey, especially considering my unfamiliarity with the context. The 
second main factor was my discovery that most of the existing work on the pension scheme in 
Lesotho is of a quantitative nature, and that some of this literature (e.g. Croome and Mapetla 
2007) asks for more qualitative work to be done. In this sense, in-depth interviews could 
contribute with something new to the understanding of the old age pension. 
 The discussions surrounding the qualitative method are many, and I will not go into 
this debate here, apart from giving a brief description. Marshall and Rossman (2011: 2) state 
that qualitative researchers “are intrigued by the complexity of social interactions expressed in 
daily life”, seeing qualitative research as “pragmatic, interpretive, and grounded in the lived 
experiences of people”. An important part of this is being open to ideas brought forth by 
informants and continually reevaluate the conceptual framework underlying the study 
(Rossman and Rallis 2003).  
Another important tenet of the qualitative method is that the researcher reflects on how 
his presence in the field and his personal biography may affect the end product of the study 
(Rossman and Rallis 2003). It is important to make this act explicit, so that readers also gain 
an insight into potential problems and biases with the end product of the research process. In 
the following, I will go into the details of my own research process as far as possible, as well 
as presenting potential problems with my approach and explaining what I did to solve them or 
lessen their impact on the results of my fieldwork. I will cover the whole research process, 
from my initial preparations, how sites and informants were selected and how the interviews 
were prepared for and conducted. All the way, I will be open about potential problems, and 
inform the choices I made during the process using theory. While this account of the research 
process for purposes of presentation will be linear, I should point out that the real-life process 
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was never that; it involved going back and forth, constantly adjusting the framework as the 
work progressed.  
The research process 
Choosing the topic 
Early on, I decided to do my thesis on social protection in the developing world. Although I 
did my Bachelor’s degree in the development field, I had learnt little about this approach, and 
it thus felt like a new and exciting way of thinking about development, poverty reduction and 
securing people’s well-being. Part of the attraction also lay in the fact that I am Norwegian, 
used to a broad provision of state welfare and with a fundamental political faith in some tasks 
being best solved by the state. In light of this, examining the viability of similar strategies in 
the South seemed an enticing prospect. 
 Choosing Lesotho and the Old Age Pension specifically was a matter of singling out 
those geographical regions and social protection programs that seemed like the most 
interesting ones. Pension schemes commanded my attention because the elderly are a group 
that usually get little attention in development thinking. Of the different developing countries 
with a pension scheme in operation, the case of Lesotho then stood out for two main reasons: 
first, the pension scheme there was relatively new, having been implemented in 2005. 
Because of this, I felt a study could contribute with some new knowledge, or at least direct 
attention to a new area, even if it was only through a small-scale study for a Master’s thesis. 
Second was the fact that Lesotho belongs to the United Nations’ group of LDCs, marking it as 
one of the poorest countries in the world. As mentioned, there are only two LDCs with some 
sort of non-contributory pension. Finding out more about Lesotho, then, could hopefully 
result in important lessons for other LDCs with regards to the implementation of pension 
schemes or social protection in general. 
Preparation 
The process of preparing for a fieldwork in a foreign country is demanding, but it is important 
to be as thorough as possible. At the same time, however, it must be recognized that it is 
impossible to prepare for all eventualities, and that a certain degree of flexibility should be 
allowed. I had little knowledge of Lesotho before deciding on the topic of this thesis, and a lot 
of the preparation I had to do was to educate myself about the basics of the country, 
specifically those aspects of it that could be relevant for my thesis, such as geography, 
economy and demography. As previously mentioned, it was difficult to find literature on the 
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pension scheme itself, but as a substitute I read literature on pension schemes in other 
countries in the South. During this process, I regarded South Africa as especially important, 
since it is Lesotho’s only neighboring country and since there has been a comprehensive non-
contributory pension scheme operating there for many years. 
 While much of the literature I found on social protection took a very positive stance 
towards the potential of this approach (e.g. Hanlon et al. 2010), I tried to balance this out by 
reading some critically minded papers as well, looking at potential problems and constraints 
concerning this approach. In my experience, it is not uncommon for the development field to 
regard any “new” approach as a cure-all for developing countries, alleviating poverty and 
leading to long-term economic development all in one, and this was also the case with some 
of the social protection literature. Early on, I tried to take a more realistic stance, viewing 
social protection as capable of making important contributions in many areas, but perhaps not 
being the ultimate approach to development. In the analysis, then, I will not limit myself to 
examining the consequences of the pension scheme, but also look at those theoretical ideas 
that have not materialized in the case of Lesotho, giving a more nuanced picture of its effects. 
 During my preparation, I also tried to make some contacts in the field before I went 
there. This mostly consisted of trying to contact the National University of Lesotho, 
specifically the Institute of Southern African Studies (ISAS), which was the institute behind 
the Lesotho pension research I had found. I regarded the institute as a good potential contact 
that could hopefully open many doors for me during my research. After some contact per 
email, I formalized my relationship to the institute upon arrival by applying for a position as 
visiting researcher. This allowed me the use of an office and their library, as well as access to 
staff members who had previously worked on projects similar to mine. My interviews with 
these staff members greatly increased my knowledge of the topic, and helped me stake out the 
course for the actual fieldwork. Through the institute, I was also put in touch with an 
interpreter. In sum, my cooperation with ISAS was a great aid to me, and improved the 
quality of my fieldwork considerably. 
Selecting sites/ Study area 
After arrival in Lesotho, I set about figuring out which places I wanted to conduct my 
interviews in. This process was done in cooperation with my interpreter, who had significant 
knowledge about the surrounding area, and was thus an invaluable asset in planning this 
aspect of the fieldwork. From the outset, I wanted to ensure that the selection of sites 
represented the varied geography of the country as far as possible. This would be the first step 
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in ensuring that my selection of informants could illustrate large variation in preconditions, 
and involved visiting sites in rural areas and in urban neighborhoods, villages that were 
isolated from the main road or ones that were situated right on it, as well as villages 
surrounded by good farming lands and those without it. 
 It should be noted that the selection of sites was not done all in one go at the outset of 
the fieldwork, but rather done one or two days in advance of the interviews taking place there. 
This allowed me to continually review the material I had up to that point, and thus decide 
which sites would suit the research better. In the end, we ended up selecting 9 villages in two 
different administrative districts, Maseru district and Berea district. The Maseru district is the 
most populous in Lesotho, while Berea ranks third (Bureau of Statistics 2009). They both 
span the three main ecological regions of the country, but the villages chosen were mostly in 
the more accessible foothills or lowlands, where most people live. 
 Of the 9 selected sites, two were located in peri-urban areas, while the rest were more 
rural villages. The urban sites were both situated on the outskirts of the capital, Maseru, one 
very close and the other further away. Of the rural villages, four of them were situated on or 
very close to one of the main roads, while the last four were only connected to the main road 
through winding dirt roads of varying lengths. The most remote village was more than one 
hour’s drive away from the nearest asphalted road. In Figure 1 below, all the circles refer to a 
village where I conducted interviews, except the ‘Maseru CBD’, which indicates the location 
of the capital. 
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Figure 1. Map of the study areas. 
While I wanted a diverse selection of sites, there were some limitations involved that also had 
to be taken into account. The necessity of being able to make the trip and return within the 
day before nightfall was one, and another was the need for arriving at the sites at a time that 
would be opportune for interviews. Since the fieldwork was conducted in the early month of 
winter in Lesotho, the day started later and ended earlier than usual, limiting my time. We 
planned to arrive after the pensioner’s had finished their morning routine, and conduct the 
interviews from then until the children came home from school. My interpreter’s schedule 
also affected when we could interview, as he worked for a local organization while also 
working for me. All of these issues made the districts of Maseru and Berea the most attractive, 
since they are relatively accessible by road, and because the University is located in Maseru 
district. In addition, the previous surveys undertaken about the pension scheme have mostly 
been undertaken in Maseru district, so focusing my efforts here would have more relevance to 
what I learned from these studies. 
 Of course, there are some potential weaknesses associated with the selection of these 
districts and sites as the study area. The fact that I chose them partly for their convenience 
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shows how my study misses out on the less accessible parts of the country. As discussed in 
the background chapter, these less accessible parts are also the poorest ones, and my 
fieldwork therefore runs the risk of not taking into account the poorest households in the 
country. I tried to ameliorate this slightly by choosing more remote places within the chosen 
districts, but there is no question that the sites I visited are not those where the poorest of the 
poor in Lesotho are found. 
 Significant time and resource constraints limited the scope of this thesis, however. 
While a study of the poorer areas would have been very interesting, it would take more time 
and resources than I had at my disposal. The closeness of the University was also a great asset 
for me, as I had access to both researchers and written material that continually shaped my 
work and outlook, as well as a place where I could work on the interview data as I gathered 
them. These facts have to be weighed against the potential problem of missing out on the 
poorest households. 
 Another potential problem with selecting areas that have already been under study is 
that I could potentially only reproduce findings that have already been published. However, 
and as mentioned before, the existing research from this area is mostly of a quantitative nature. 
I therefore feel justified in believing that a qualitative study would bring new issues to the 
fore, even if it covers some of the same geographical areas. In this way, the earlier 
quantitative studies could also be brought in to inform the results from my research in a more 
thorough way. 
Sampling, negotiating entry and recruiting informants 
An important part of conducting a fieldwork is sampling, or choosing who to talk with, where, 
when, about what and why (Miles and Huberman 1994). Sampling decisions should always be 
based on the research question, as well as existing theoretical and background knowledge, and 
they should be made explicit by the researcher (Marshall and Rossman 2011). Well-developed 
sampling decisions are crucial for the study’s soundness, and profoundly affect what issues it 
can inform. 
 One of the fundamental characteristics of qualitative sampling is that it is purposive 
instead of random (Miles and Huberman 1994). This means that the sample is hand-picked to 
be part of the study, because it is the best way of examining the questions at hand. Often, the 
selection of informants will not be set in stone prior to the study, and can evolve once the 
fieldwork progresses. Miles and Huberman (1994: 27) call this process “conceptually-driven 
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sequential sampling”. In this view, while some initial selection is required, there is also a 
continuous redrawing of the study parameters.  
 There are a number of different ways to go about the sampling process. Miles and 
Huberman (1994: 28) give a list of 16 different sampling methods, each one suited to studies 
with different purposes. I will not go into the full list here, except to explain the strategy I 
used in my fieldwork. For me, it was never important to find an “average” pensioner 
household, but rather to illustrate the depth of experiences tied to receiving the pension, and to 
show how different preconditions create different consequences across households as well as 
seeing what different households have in common with each other. In Miles & Huberman’s 
terminology this would be a sampling strategy of “maximum variation”, or “a deliberate hunt 
for negative instances or variations” (Miles and Huberman 1994: 29). For Marshall and 
Rossman (2011: 111), the maximum variation approach “documents diverse variation and 
identifies important common patterns”. It is not the total number of informants that is 
important in this approach, but rather their individual characteristics. 
Sampling was a continuous process during my time in the field. While geographical 
variation was important in selecting sites, I also tried to gather a diverse group of informants 
within each site, in order to achieve “maximum variance”. The decisions I made in this phase 
was mostly based on guesses: what characteristics could produce differences in effects of 
receiving a pension? When examining the population of elderly people, internal variations 
include their age, ranging from the “young old” to the “oldest-old”, as well as their gender, 
living standard, health, number of dependents and so on. Because of the lack of a thorough or 
easily accessible overview of pensioners, the concrete process of selecting the individual 
informants was always done on the day of the interviews, after arriving at the site and 
following a specific approach detailed below. Thus, I could not hand-pick informants so that 
they suited the sampling strategy perfectly, but had to do the best I could within each village. 
As I did more interviews, I continually reviewed my data, trying to make sure that as many 
variations as possible were included, and I also stayed alert for other possible variances in the 
population of elderly people that would be interesting to include. This allowed me to make 
more informed decisions, as my knowledge of the context grew. In the end, I had a selection 
of informants that varied according to many factors, and from my pool of interviews, I have 
been able to select those that are most capable of illustrating the depth of experiences this 
thesis set out to illustrate. 
After deciding on the preliminary sampling strategy, the next step was to gain entry to 
the field and finding the best way to recruit informants. When seeking to gain entry, a 
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researcher often has to negotiate access with so-called gatekeepers. Gatekeepers could be 
community leaders, village elders or people in official positions (Willis 2006). In Lesotho, all 
villages have a chief, usually someone with a relation to the royal line, which still carries 
authority in the local context. In order for me, as an outside researcher, to get access to 
possible informants, it was necessary for me and my interpreter to first introduce ourselves to 
the chief, and get his or her permission to conduct the interviews. Every time we arrived at a 
new village, we used some time to present myself as well as the topic and purpose of my 
research to the chief, and also give a letter, written in Sesotho and signed by the University, 
stating the same. This letter would be kept by the chief, so that there was a way of reaching 
me if it turned out to be necessary.  
Meeting the chief would also be the first step in finding and recruiting informants. 
After presenting the research and getting permission to walk around the village and conduct 
interviews, we would ask the chief who were potential informants and where they lived. The 
chief is usually knowledgeable about local residents and therefore a good starting point for 
this kind of information. In this way, I used the gatekeeper as a way of recruiting informants.  
There are some problems attached to this approach. The authority of the gatekeeper, in 
this case the chief, could make the proposed informants feel obligated or forced to participate, 
even if they did not want to. Also, there was the possibility of the chief leading us to those 
pensioners that he had the most contact with, intentionally or unintentionally leaving out 
important segments of the population of potential informants. This could lead to a certain bias 
in the results, as unique or opposing experiences are left out. 
To avoid these consequences as much as possible, I also employed an alternative 
method of recruiting informants, namely that of snowballing. Snowballing involves asking 
one informant to suggest other informants, who in turn suggest yet other (Willis 2006). By 
asking each informant to suggest multiple other informants, the chance of tapping into several 
networks of people is higher, and I would not risk following a single network for all the 
interviews in a village. While following this strategy did not completely eliminate the chance 
of this happening, it was also the only option open to me, as finding pensioners through any 
other means would have been very difficult. 
When asking the chief for informants, he or she would usually suggest a number of 
possible informants, and we would start out by following directions to the first houses and 
proceed to ask these pensioners to suggest yet other pensioners. Sometimes, we would ask the 
chief to simply point us in the direction of pensioner’s homes, in other cases we would ask 
more specifically for those informants I felt I still had not talked to, e.g. an older woman 
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living alone, to flesh out the variance in my sample. This method worked well, and secured a 
diverse selection of informants. 
 Another potential with this approach is that I could be seen as cooperating with the 
chief, which could conceivably affect their answers. While the chiefs in most cases would go 
about their business after pointing us in the right direction, leaving me and my interpreter free 
to walk around the village as we wanted to, we were sometimes accompanied by one of the 
household members of the chief, and in one case the chief himself walked with us, rounding 
up other possible informants while I was conducting the interviews. Such perceived 
cooperation could lead to people dampening possible criticisms or telling me what they 
thought I would like to hear. 
Since the pension is governmental, however, and the chief belongs to the hereditary 
system of power, there is no connection between the two. Whether the pensioner is aware of 
this is a different question, but I never got the feeling that they were holding back criticisms 
when asked about the administrative aspects of the pension scheme. In the cases where 
informants were recruited for me (by the chief or his representative) I cannot be sure what 
they were told to get them to participate, so I had to make sure I was even more thorough 
when informing them of my research’s purpose, and giving them a chance to discontinue their 
participation. While some informants might have felt pressured into participating, it was easy 
to tell in the interview situation who was really interested in participating, thus weeding out 
those who were not. Also, taking into account the customs of Lesotho, circumventing the 
chief was not an option, and any disadvantages this raised would have to be dealt with. In all 
villages, I was welcomed and allowed to interview the elderly, and using the snowballing 
method in this way turned out to be a good way of gaining informants, all things considered. 
A presentation of the informants I used in this thesis is found in appendix I. All have 
been given fictitious names, to ensure their confidentiality. 
Interviewing 
Even though the qualitative method embraces several different techniques, as mentioned 
above, the most common one is probably the interview. Qualitative interviews are usually 
divided into three main types: structured, semi-structures and unstructured (Willis 2006). The 
choice of interview type depends on the nature of the research as well as the preferences of 
the researcher and the preferences of the informants. For example, a structured interview 
might take less time and facilitate generalizations, while the unstructured interview allows the 
researcher to discover new ideas and interpretations. For me, the middle ground of semi-
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structured interviews was more appealing, since they allowed me to cover both those things I 
felt were important, but also allowed the interviewee to bring up things that I had not planned 
on discussing. This is an advantage, especially since the setting was unknown to me, and a 
flexible approach like this could lead to interesting discoveries. 
 Using interviews in this way can provide simple, factual information, but it can also be 
used to explore attitudes and opinions (Willis 2006). The value of interviews is mostly that 
they allow a researcher to explain patterns as seen from the informant’s viewpoint, instead of 
simply uncovering patterns and then originating an explanation in theory or from his own 
head. There is no guarantee that an interview will produce true information, however, and its 
success largely depends on how the interviewee sees the interviewer (Hesselberg 2011). 
Therefore, much care must be put into making the informant comfortable, by for instance 
adapting behavior and appearance to local rules and customs, hopefully minimizing the chan-
ces of untrue information. Important questions that need to be resolved in an interview-based 
approach to research is where and when the interviews should take place; how questions 
should be ordered; and whether or not the interviews should be recorded (Willis 2006).  
 My own interviews were undertaken over an intensive period of three weeks, since 
most of the first part of my stay was consumed by administrative work, planning and 
preparation. This intensity has both positive and negative sides. On the plus side, it allowed 
me to quickly get in to the rhythm of interviewing people, and made me familiar with my 
interview guide. I also got to know my interpreter, and we quickly found a rhythm in our 
work that we were both comfortable with. 
 On the other hand, however, having more time between interviews would have meant 
that I could have more time to look over my findings while still in the field, allowing me 
greater knowledge of what aspects of the pension and its impact that I had not yet covered. 
This could have improved the sampling process. As it was, I could only briefly sketch which 
issues I wanted to cover more thoroughly in the following days of interviewing. More time in 
the interview process could also have allowed me to work more with the individual interviews, 
reviewing and improving notes while the interviews were still fresh in my mind. The delay in 
this process necessarily means that some details have been lost from the interviews. Still, 
because I recorded the interviews, this problem is not as large as it could have been. 
 With regards to the when and where of the interviews, a lot was left up to the 
informant’s preference. As mentioned above, I and my interpreter tried to arrive after the 
morning routine was finished, since we assumed that this was when the elderly would be 
available for interviews. This turned out to be accurate, and very few of those we approached 
61 
 
said no to participate, even those who were engaged in some sort of household work. Most of 
the interviews were undertaken inside or outside the informant’s home, sometimes depending 
on the weather, other times on what the pensioner was doing. Conducting the interview in or 
near the residence of the informant was beneficial for several reasons, first and foremost 
because it allowed me to observe their living conditions and household dynamics more 
closely, adding to the information they gave me themselves.  
Of course, this could also be problematic, as the interview could be interrupted or 
interfered with by other household members or activities. In many of the interviews family 
members made comments or corrected information that was given by the informant. This 
could be a disadvantage, disrupting the flow of the interview or making the interviewee 
insecure, but it could also add more accuracy, for instance in factual questions like 
approximate income or who was related how to whom. Asking people to leave their own 
house so I could conduct my interview was not really an option, and many of the pensioners 
had a hard time moving around, so interference was simply an issue I had to deal with.  
In one village, the chief felt it was better to assemble elderly people outside his own 
home, which led me to conduct an impromptu group interview. In another, the interviews 
were conducted in a central location in the village, while the chief went around and got people 
to participate. Both of these options were for me less attractive than interviewing people in or 
outside their homes, so I always tried to make sure to do this as often as possible. 
 A central issue in interviewing people in developing countries, especially when the 
research deals with some official program or initiative, is that possible participants think that 
the researcher is affiliated with the program or the government, and as such has the authority 
to affect their participation or the benefits they receive. This could result in a number of 
difficulties: for one thing, informants could hold back criticism for fear of retaliation. On the 
other hand, they could also misrepresent their living situation so that they seem poorer than 
they are, hoping to receive more money or benefits. This is a common concern in developing 
country research, and necessitated that I make it perfectly clear that I was not affiliated with 
the administration of the pension scheme in any way and that I could not affect the amount 
given. Of course, there is no guarantee that my informants did not exaggerate their poverty, as 
they could still believe it was advantageous for them to do so. All of my informants, barring 
one, complained that the amount given as pension was too low, but this result is the same as 
in the thorough study performed by the University (Croome and Mapetla 2007), and could 
just be a reflection of the fact that the pension is a relatively small amount, especially when it 
is shared among a household. Additionally, to ensure that people’s well-being was not being 
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misrepresented, I could ask follow-up questions to the answers given, and observe my 
surroundings thoroughly. This concern was important for making me prefer interviews in the 
informant’s household, since it facilitated this kind of observation. 
 Originally, I had planned to speak to the whole household, but this proved more 
difficult than I had thought. Many household consisted only of the pensioners and their 
grandchildren, where the pensioner’s children had either passed away or moved somewhere 
else to get work. The timings of the interviews were also such that if any adult sons or 
daughters were living with their pensioner parents, they were at work, and the only people 
present were children or youths. In the end, I only succeeded in interviewing non-pensioner 
members of the household on a few occasions. While this meant that I could focus more 
exclusively on the situation of the elderly and how the pension affects them, it has also 
impacted my ability to say something about how the whole household was affected from 
someone else’s point of view, a weakness considering that the money is usually spent as 
household income. Still, household members sometimes chimed into the discussion and 
provided information, even if I did not interview them one-on-one. 
 For semi-structured interviews like the ones I conducted, the researcher usually makes 
an interview guide containing the questions or topics he would like to cover during the 
interview. The interview guide I had made contained several broad topics for discussion (see 
appendix II). First, I gave some general information about myself and my research, giving 
them the opportunity to cancel their participation at any time during the interview. I then 
asked some factual questions, to establish a contact with the informant as well as gather some 
basic info. The interview then proceeded to talk about the pension, both revolving around 
practicalities and around the pensioner’s opinions on it. Lastly, I asked about the situation for 
the elderly, and if any changes had taken place. When finishing the interview, I gave the 
informant the option of asking me questions, in case they were unclear or curious about 
something. This interview design largely follows the points made by Willis (2006) on how to 
construct an interview guide. There were very few occasions where the informant did not 
want to answer a question, and only two interviews were cancelled before being completed, 
one by the informant and one by me.  
Before starting the interview, I always asked if it was ok that I record it. For me, 
recording the interview had significant benefits, as it gave me more time to listen and observe 
without having to take notes constantly. This was especially an advantage because of my 
relative inexperience as an interviewer, as it allowed me to concentrate fully on the 
conversation, without the stress of constantly taking notes. Having a recording of the 
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interviews has also been beneficial to the analysis process, as it allows me to go back and 
listen more carefully to what was said. Consequently, all the interviews were recorded, except 
one where the interviewee did not want the tape recorder to be on. Interviews ranged in time 
from 20 minutes for the shortest ones to near an hour. 
Working with an interpreter 
Using an interpreter in my fieldwork was completely necessary, as I lacked any knowledge of 
the native language Sesotho, and because very few of the informant knew more than some 
elementary words in English. Working with an interpreter is potentially problematic, however. 
Bujra (2006) lists three different ways in which researching through a third party can be 
troublesome. First, there are practical issues, relating, for instance, to cost and time. Second 
are technical problems, e.g. whether to translate word-for-word or each statement as a whole. 
This reflects the recognition that the interpreter does not simply transmit what an informant 
says directly to the researcher, but rather adds some of his own interpretations and meanings 
to them. Thus, just like the researcher affects the data, so too does the interpreter. Third is the 
need to negotiate the relationship between interpreter and researcher. In working with an 
interpreter, the researcher must give up some control over the data collecting process, but 
must also remain in control so that the research continues to be his and not the interpreter’s.  
As mentioned above, I got in touch with my interpreter through my contacts at the 
national university. Atang Tlopo, a 30 year old social worker, had previously worked for the 
University as a part-time research assistant, participating in seven research projects 
undertaken by ISAS, the institute I was affiliated with. A few of these projects were related to 
the pension scheme, so he had some experience with interviewing pensioners already. This 
experience, as well as his credentials from the University and his demeanor, assured me that 
he was competent and that he understood my research. His experience in conducting surveys 
also meant that he knew the surrounding areas well, and could suggest sites based on the 
criteria I laid out. Sesotho is by far the dominating language in Lesotho, so there was no 
question of multiple language proficiencies. 
 In hiring an experienced, but not professional, interpreter, I successfully balanced the 
need for competency with the resources I had available to spend on a research assistant, and 
thus avoided some of the practical issues Bujra (2006) foresees as problematic. I also had a 
conversation with Atang before beginning the interview part of my fieldwork, where I 
explained what I expected from him as an interpreter, and how he should translate all that an 
informant says, not remove anything, no matter how insignificant it may seem. Another issue 
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we discussed early was how my research would be presented. I wrote down a thorough 
introduction in English, which we then discussed and he translated into Sesotho. This 
hopefully resulted in a standardized introduction which was understandable for the informants, 
and gave them a good sense of what I wanted to do with my research. 
 In some of the initial interviews, it became clear that his experience with research 
interviews was mainly quantitative, as he would ask questions from the interview guide and 
note down the answers himself, giving me only short translations of the content. I explained 
that I would be asking the questions and that he should translate the entire answer to me, so 
that I could ask follow-up questions or ask for clarifications. He quickly got the hang of this, 
and our cooperation was for the most part unproblematic. I also felt that he treated informants 
well and that they respected him in turn. 
The trustworthiness of research 
In any research project there are going to be questions of trustworthiness. In short, how will 
the researcher, or anyone else, be able to know that the results emerging from research are 
good? In order to ensure the “goodness” of research, a shared set of standards can be applied 
across different studies. Some opponents argue that applying such standards is not really 
possible, due to the subjective nature of qualitative research, and that doing so would miss out 
on the contextual and interpretive nature of this way of doing research (Miles and Huberman 
1994). The case for some sort of shared standard for assessing qualitative research can be 
illustrated by taking the view that 
“qualitative studies take place in a real social world, and can have real consequences 
in people’s lives; that there is a reasonable view of “what happened” in any 
particular situation (including what was believed, interpreted, etc.); and that we who 
render accounts of it can do so well or poorly, and should not consider our work 
unjudgable.” (Miles and Huberman 1994: 277) 
There is much debate about what this shared standard should consist of. Often, the 
trustworthiness of qualitative research designs has been judged by standards derived from 
quantitative approaches, revolving around reliability, validity, objectivity and generalizability. 
Marshall and Rossman (2011) refer to this as a form of “physics envy”, an envy that has been 
challenged by the postmodern turn, which has led to the development of alternative concepts 
more appropriate to a qualitative approach. The first set of alternative concepts were put 
forward by Lincoln & Guba in 1985 (ref. in Marshall and Rossman 2011) and include 
dependability, credibility, confirmability and transferability. These concepts roughly correlate 
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to the quantitative ones, but can be said to make the ideas more accessible and understandable 
by using ordinary language terms rather than quantitative terminology (Kvale  in Marshall and 
Rossman 2011). Here, I will use the latter set of terms, as I feel that these capture the essence 
of qualitative research better.  
The dependability of a study refers to whether the process of a study is consistent and 
stable over time (Miles and Huberman 1994). Its confirmability depends on the relative 
freedom of the research conclusions from the researcher’s biases, or at least that these biases 
and their possible influence are made explicit. Credibility is very central in research, as it 
deals with the issue of truth: do the findings of the study make sense and are they credible to 
the people being studied as well as the readers? Of course, the types of understanding that 
emerge from a qualitative study differ from each other, and depend on the design and purpose 
of each study individually. Different types of such understanding include descriptive, 
interpretive, theoretical and evaluative (Maxwell in Miles and Huberman 1994). Lastly, 
transferability deals with the degree to which the results of a study can be transferred to other 
contexts, i.e. if they have significance for more cases than the one in question. This is a 
central issue in the critique of qualitative studies, as it is often claimed that their context-
oriented nature makes generalization impossible, and that each study can only say something 
about the chosen sample, rather than the larger population. Therefore, it is important for the 
researcher to be explicit about the larger implications of his study, both making clear what it 
can say and what it cannot say about a larger phenomenon. 
It is, of course, impossible for me as a researcher to guarantee that all of these criteria 
for “good” research have been fulfilled. I strived to make the research as reliable as possible, 
however, and can make some general comments here. I tried to be consistent in the process 
followed throughout my fieldwork, in that informants were recruited in the same way, they 
were given the same information about my research, and I also tried to make the interview 
situation as similar as possible between the different interviewees and locations. This should 
affect the dependability of the study favorably. The confirmability issue is harder to address, 
as all researchers carry biases and their own way of looking at the world. However, by taking 
a semi-structured approach to interviews and letting informants bring up their own ideas when 
they wanted to, frees the results at least somewhat from my own expectations. This also 
affects the analysis chapter below, where I have tried to take the informants’ answers as a 
starting point instead of my own expectations of results. 
As for credibility, I have already mentioned the way in which I used observation or 
follow-up questions to pursue information given by the interviewees. I also regularly talked to 
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my interpreter about the different informants, since he is likely to have gotten more of a sense 
of how truthful they were. In some cases, I have had to drop interviews where the informant 
was obviously lying, for instance by portraying his living situation as worse than it actually 
was. While truth cannot be guaranteed, these steps at least ensure more credibility. In the 
analysis below, I also try to compare my results to those found in earlier surveys, further 
putting my results in context. 
Transferability is a tough issue in any qualitative study, so also in mine. While this 
will be dealt with further later on, it should be noted that there are many peculiar 
circumstances in Lesotho that make the results of this thesis difficult to simply transfer to 
other contexts. With awareness of these circumstances, however, some lessons can always be 
learnt, even if the whole of the conclusion is not immediately transferable. 
Ethical considerations 
Another aspect of trustworthiness is the degree to which a research project is ethical, as any 
such project should have a thorough consideration of ethics at its base. This is perhaps 
especially true when the fieldwork in question is done in a foreign context, because it can be 
more difficult for the researcher to get a complete overview of the ethical implications of the 
work. At the core of all qualitative research there has to be a fundamental respect for persons, 
beneficence, summarized by the adage “do no harm”, and justice, or a consideration of who 
benefits from the study (Marshall and Rossman 2011). These basic tenets must guide the 
researcher through the whole process. 
 Matters of ethics are often wrongly reduced to the principle of informed consent. The 
principle itself posits that the researcher can carry on his research only after explaining to the 
involved parties what the purpose of the study is, and what the intended outcomes are, both 
for the researcher himself and for the participants (Brydon 2006). The consent given by the 
informant should be voluntary, i.e. given without any sort of pressure, and informed, i.e. that 
the participant fully understands what his or her participation involves, as well as the potential 
consequences this participation might have. In qualitative research, informed consent can be 
problematic, since the focus of the research can change as it goes on (Miles and Huberman 
1994). Still, the researcher needs to inform as much as he can at the outset of research, as well 
as continually considering the topic as the research progresses. As I have already mentioned, I 
started out all my interviews by giving basic information about my research and underlining 
that participation was voluntary. I also gave them the opportunity to cancel their participation 
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at any time. Since my research project did not change focus considerably, I believe this was 
sufficient to ensure my interviewee’s informed consent. 
Another central issue in ethical research is that of confidentiality. A researcher must 
consider how the study will intrude on people’s personal information, how this information 
will be guarded and how it should be used in the final product of the research (Miles and 
Huberman 1994). It is common to promise confidentiality and anonymity when an informant 
agrees to be interviewed, but it is very important that the researcher follows up on this even if 
it hurts the research. An example of this would be if an interviewee provides invaluable 
information, but has to be removed because the information made it too easy to identify that 
specific informant, thus breaking the promise of anonymity. Here, there is a clear dilemma 
between fulfilling the scientific demands of a research project with regards to the study’s 
credibility, and protecting the participant’s anonymity. The priority should always be in 
ensuring that participants are well-anonymized. In my fieldwork, I have anonymized all the 
participants by giving them fictitious names and not stating which villages they lived in. The 
topic of my research cannot be said to be very controversial, and I have found little reason to 
remove interview content or break up stories. 
Summary 
In this chapter, I have gone through the methodology underlying my fieldwork. Taking a 
qualitative approach means that it is necessary to reflect on my own position as a researcher 
and how this might have affected certain parts of my fieldwork. In the interest of clarifying 
such potential problems, I have gone through my approach to the field, discussed some of the 
problems that occurred and what I did to counteract these. These problems include my own 
inexperience and unfamiliarity with the context in addition to various issues regarding the 
interview situation, such as interpreting or appearing to be affiliated with the pension scheme 
in some official capacity. Another weakness is the fact that I was not able to visit sites in the 
more remote parts of the country, thus missing out on the poorest region of Lesotho. Through 
preparation, cooperation with local institutions and researchers, a good relationship with my 
interpreter, thoroughly informing my interviewees and a conscious strategy for selecting 
informants, I believe I have managed to deal with these problems in a good way. In my 
opinion, this has resulted in my findings being accurate and reliable. 
68 
 
  
69 
 
6. The Lesotho Old Age Pension 
Having reviewed the merits of social protection as well as some of the characteristics of the 
elderly and of pension schemes, I turn towards examining the Lesotho Old Age Pension. In 
the introduction chapter, the research question for this thesis was laid out: How has the 
Lesotho pension scheme been implemented, and what consequences can be identified? In this 
chapter, I seek to answer this question, drawing on my own fieldwork and the ideas laid out in 
the theory chapters above. I will first go through the implementation of the pension scheme, 
discussing the way Lesotho tackled and overcame the constraints they were facing during this 
process. To describe the implementation process, I will use outside sources, as my interviews 
were mainly with pension recipients, not pension officials. 
 After discussing this process, I will turn to the results from my own fieldwork and see 
what these can reveal about the potential consequences of the pension scheme. I will go 
through several different categories of expected or identified impacts, originating both in 
theory and in my informants’ answers, and expand on my findings by using other sources 
exploring the same topic.  
Throughout the discussion, I will refer to a survey conducted by the Lesotho Pensions 
Impact Group (LPIG), a multi-disciplinary research group from the National University of 
Lesotho. This quantitative survey, published as Croome and Mapetla (2007), was conducted 
in April 2006, and involved 215 pensioner households and 215 non-pensioner households 
from the administrative district of Manonyane. It covered many different areas, reflecting the 
multi-disciplinary group it originated from, and holistically tried to assess the impact of the 
pension on its recipients. As such, it is clearly the best resource on the Lesotho pension 
scheme, and I will therefore be using it to inform my own results where appropriate. In the 
following, I will refer to it as the LPIG survey. In addition to the survey, there are some 
derivative works building on it, such as Nyanguru (2007) and Bello et al. (2008). There is also 
a survey undertaken in the poorer Mountain Zone of Lesotho building on the same approach 
as the LPIG survey, but focusing more on food security (Croome et al. 2007). These other 
works will be used to expand on my own results as well.  
In the end, I hope to be able to evaluate the impacts of the Lesotho pension scheme 
thoroughly. Throughout the analysis, I will be referring to the observations made in the 
chapters on social protection and on old age. The most important points to keep in mind is the 
definition of social protection given initially, as well as the three purposes of social protection 
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found in Barrientos and Hulme (2008): protecting basic levels of consumption; facilitating 
investment in human and other productive assets; and strengthening the agency of the poor. I 
will also be referring to the results from the pension scheme in neighboring South Africa.  
The implementation of the pension scheme 
Previously, five basic principles necessary for the success of social transfers were laid out: 
they have to be fair, assured, practical, substantial and popular. It was then pointed out that in 
order to ensure these five principles, different constraints would have to be overcome. These 
constraints are connected to political, administrative, information and resource issues, and are 
present in most developing countries. Together, these constraints challenge the successful 
implementation of social transfers, and seeing how Lesotho managed this is central to 
answering my research question. This information can also serve as an example for other 
countries, seeking to implement a similar scheme. 
First, some simple facts about the scheme itself: The Lesotho Old Age Pension was 
implemented in 2005, after being announced the preceding year (Ellis et al. 2009). The 
pension scheme is universal and non-contributory, and it is extended to all citizens aged 70 or 
above. Each month, on a set payment day, pensioners pick up their pension from their local 
post office. The amount was initially set to M150, which was slightly higher than the national 
poverty line at the time, but it has since been raised two times, and was at the time of my 
fieldwork set at M300 ($44) per month.  
While I will go through the political process surrounding the pension scheme below, it 
is informative to mention the three points that were brought up in the round of debates held in 
Parliament, and which can say something about the aims of the pension (Hagen 2008). First, 
the importance of extending a helping hand to the elderly was mentioned, out of obligation for 
their service to the country. Second, the potential to alleviate poverty was highlighted, among 
the elderly themselves but also among their grandchildren, as it was recognized that the 
elderly are now often the sole providers for these children because of HIV/AIDS and/or 
migration. Third, the elderly’s right to social protection was underlined, and that it was 
necessary to reduce the marginalization of older people from society. From these three points, 
it seems apparent that the central goals for the Lesotho pension scheme were alleviation of 
poverty, both for children and for the elderly, and empowerment of the elderly. These points 
take into account some of the hardships of older people in developing countries, and cover 
two of the three purposes of social protection as listed above. 
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The political process  
Officially, the pension was announced in the budget speech for the 2004/2005 fiscal year held 
by the Minister of Finance and Development Planning in February 2004. The speech itself 
gives little insight into the motivations behind this implementation, stating only that “it has 
been Government’s wish to provide our old people with a pension”, before going on to 
mention that registration arrangements would be set up within the year and the required 
amount of money set aside for the project (Government of Lesotho 2004).  
I have discussed how there is often a political resistance to implementing social 
protection in low-income countries, and it is thus interesting to examine more closely how the 
pension scheme came about. Hagen (2008) recounts the process leading up to the 2004 
declaration. According to her, the first steps towards a pension scheme were taken already in 
1993, when the introduction of a universal pension became part of the manifesto of the ruling 
party. While this did result in the initiation of a registration process, the scheme itself was 
never introduced. This was at least partly related to administrative constraints, in that many of 
the local chiefs responsible for registering all those aged 60 or above were exploiting the 
scheme to benefit their own relatives or taking bribes to register unqualified people. In 1998, 
the Government commissioned a study on the cost of implementing a pension for all citizens 
aged 70 or above, but it was found to be prohibitively expensive, and the pension was yet 
again set aside, now due to lack of resources. 
 Throughout this period, even in the years immediately preceding 2004, there was very 
little public debate about the pension (Hagen 2008).  There are few interest groups 
representing the elderly in Lesotho, and the only significant one was at best marginally 
involved before the pension was introduced. Also, even though the ruling party had the 
pension on its manifesto, it was never given as a central electoral pledge and was 
consequently not an issue in campaigns preceding elections (Pelham 2007). Thus, while there 
is no doubt that people would welcome a pension scheme, it is hard to identify the populace 
as the main agent in bringing about the pension scheme. Because of this, it is necessary to 
look to the supply side of politics (Hagen 2008). 
 Here, Pelham (2007: 12) highlights the role of the Prime Minister, Pakalitha Mosisili, 
and speculates that his “personal style of government” combined with the small size of the 
country affords him the opportunity to “make decisions and have them acted upon without the 
political turbulence or lengthy administrative procedures that may hinder other democracies”. 
This idea is supported by the fact that government handout programs are often called 
“mosisilis” by its recipients. The fact that the pension announcement was introduced to 
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Thahane’s speech only three days before it was read, without any public or parliamentary 
debate, also adds credence to this line of thinking (Pelham 2007). Even the Department of 
Pensions, in charge of the existing military and civil servant pension schemes, and thus first in 
line to manage the new non-contributory pension, had not received any information prior to it 
being announced to the whole nation over the radio. 
 After the pension was announced, there were few political problems in the 
implementation process. Passing the bill through Parliament took three days, finalized a mere 
twelve days before the first payments were due, and with full support from the opposition 
(Pelham 2007). Thus, it seems that Lesotho wholly circumvented the political constraints 
often attached to implementing social protection in developing countries. This is, no doubt, in 
part due to the Prime Minister’s “style of government”, but it can also be related to the fact 
that the transfer in question was a pension scheme. As discussed previously, pension schemes 
are more politically feasible, because the elderly who live in poverty are often seen as the 
“deserving poor”.  
In the previous chapter, I discussed differing reasons for why the elderly should be the 
targets of social protection initiatives over other groups. In the case of Lesotho, it seems that 
little thought was given to this, and the elderly were simply assumed to be in need of such aid. 
As already mentioned, the population of Lesotho will not experience significant ageing, and 
this is thus an unlikely motive as well. It is of course difficult to say which reasons the Prime 
Minister had to implement a pension scheme, other than the three goals raised in the 
Parliamentary discussion listed above. The influence from pension schemes in neighboring 
countries, especially in South Africa, must also be taken into account, as there is little doubt 
that this has increased the national demand for a pension (Barrientos 2009). On the political 
side, then, it seems that the old age pension in Lesotho is a special case, implemented under 
conditions unlikely to be copied in many other countries. 
Financing the pension 
While there were few political constraints, resource constraints were a more significant 
obstacle, as Lesotho is a very low-income country and could be expected to face considerable 
difficulties in financing a social transfer. There is always the long-term possibility that the 
transfer will finance itself through beneficial economic consequences, but short-term 
affordability still has to be taken into account. However, and as discussed above, there are 
different ways of reducing the fiscal impact of the transfer, primarily through targeting the 
transfer to a limited group. 
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A pension scheme is in and of itself limited, since it is targeted towards the elderly. 
Within the category of older people, there is some leeway in deciding who the recipients are. 
As discussed before, there is no definite threshold for old age, and thus no “given” age of 
eligibility. It is also possible, as in the case of South Africa, to employ a means test together 
with the pension, to further limit the group of recipients to only include the poorest. In the end, 
the Lesotho pension scheme set age as its only criterion, and recipients must be 70 years or 
older. The only people excluded from receiving the pension are those who are already 
receiving other public (contributory) pension payments. 
Setting the age as high as 70 years can be questioned. For one thing, this is higher than 
the definitions commonly used by the United Nations or other African countries. In South 
Africa, for instance, the age of eligibility for the pension is 60 for women and 65 for men. 
Ellis et al. (2009) see the high age of eligibility as one of the weaknesses of the Lesotho 
pension, since it possibly excludes a group of people who are too old to work and earn an 
income, but not yet old enough to receive the pension. It also limits the time each household 
receives the benefits, because of the low remaining life expectancy of those who have already 
turned 70. 
Another argument against the high age of eligibility is that it threatens the degree to 
which the populace sees the pension scheme as fair. In the LPIG survey, 66% of respondents 
said that they thought 70 was not the right age to start giving the pension, the majority saying 
it should be between 56 and 69, at an average of 62 years. Another threat to the legitimacy of 
the pension seen from this perspective was the amount: initially set at M150, 90% of 
pensioners in the survey said that this was too little to meet their personal needs. The low 
amount also threatens the degree to which the pension is substantial, in that it might not be 
large enough to effect changes in the recipient’s life. This is of concern to Bello et al. (2008: 
101), who states that “as long as the elderlies have dependents who are themselves not wage 
earners, the old age pension programme might not take them our of poverty”. 
Despite these misgivings, it must be underlined that the high age threshold has made 
the pension far more affordable for Lesotho, as well as making it more politically feasible. 
The same can be said for the low initial amount. While the counterarguments are valid, in that 
the pension misses out on a lot of poverty and vulnerability by being set so high, this can 
always be adjusted later. A social transfer like this, once established, is difficult to remove, 
and it might thus be a better idea to start out with limited coverage, and extend this later, thus 
making it fairer and more substantial in the long run. This is also what happened to the 
Lesotho pension scheme, since the benefit amount has been increased twice in the seven-year 
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period of the pension scheme. Still, the Lesotho pension is less than a third of the value of the 
South African pension. 
The affordability of the pension scheme can be demonstrated by looking at the 
numbers: In the first fiscal year of operation, the pension scheme cost M126 million, which 
amounted to 1,4% of GDP and  2,7% of government expenditure (Ellis et al. 2009; Hanlon et 
al. 2010). This is similar to other examples of social transfers in other parts of the developing 
world, and shows that through adapting a transfer’s design through various measures, social 
transfers can indeed be financially viable even in very low-income countries. To show how 
the age of eligibility and the amount has affected the pension’s affordability, Ellis et al. (2009) 
estimate that lowering the age to 65 would add 49,000 pensioners to the scheme and increase 
the cost by M120 million, a near doubling. For a poor country like Lesotho, this is significant. 
It is also worth noting that the pension scheme has been fully financed by domestic tax 
revenues since its implementation. Having domestic financing was seen as a precondition for 
a social transfer being assured in the long run by Barrientos (2010), and Lesotho can be said 
to have accomplished this. A central long-term challenge is expanding domestic revenue 
mobilization, which can also be observed in Lesotho: in 2005 and 2006, domestic tax revenue 
increased by 17% and 18%, while the budgetary requirement of the old age pension in the 
same two years rose by about 7% (Bello et al. 2008). As Hagen (2008) points out, having 
domestic financing makes the pension vulnerable to economic downturns or a change in 
priorities on part of the government, but this vulnerability would be present even if the 
pension was donor-financed, only then depending on a different country’s economic fortunes 
and political climate, potentially even more precarious.  
Administration, registration and distribution 
All developing countries can be expected to face constraints related to information and 
administration. In Lesotho, these were compounded by the fact that there were no attempts to 
assess demand, use or feasibility of the pension, and no system of evaluating impacts in place, 
due to the speed of implementation (Pelham 2007). To ensure that transfers are practical and 
assured, these constraints have to be overcome, by creating an effective structure for manag-
ing and overseeing the transfer in question, as well as solving issues related to registration and 
distribution. In discussing these, I will draw on the findings from my fieldwork. 
Administratively, the pension is managed by the Department of Pensions under the 
Ministry of Finance and Development Planning, supervised by a Commissioner of Pensions 
(Pelham 2007). The implementation of the pension scheme was accompanied by creating 
75 
 
District Officer positions in each of the country’s districts to help monitor the pension 
payments on the local level, as well as incorporating the local chiefs into the administration to 
varying degrees. Thus, a managing structure was built, partly based on the existing hierarchies 
in Basotho society.  
Registration of those eligible was very challenging. The speed of implementation 
meant that the Department of Pensions only had six weeks in which to register all pensioners 
before the pensions were supposed to be paid (Hagen 2008). Lacking official documents is 
common in the developing world, so also in Lesotho. A few years before the introduction of 
the pension, however, a thorough voter registration process had been undertaken, and the 
infrastructure from then was still in place. This could be used to register pensioners, and their 
voting cards could be used to identify them. When pensioners still lacked official documents, 
a participatory approach was taken, estimating their age by what events they could remember 
from their life in cooperation with the chiefs. 
 The difficulties in the registration process can be exemplified by some of my 
informants. Limpho and Palesa, both aged over 70 at the time of implementation, had not 
been receiving the pension since then. Both of them put it down to their own ignorance of the 
pension scheme and eligibility criteria, and Palesa also stated that she was not in possession of 
her identity papers at the time of registration, and thus could not prove her eligibility. Even 
further into the program, there have been difficulties: Lerato, who, at the age of 71 had only 
received the pension for a few months, met some trouble when she went to the chief’s office 
to register, as she was told that she had to be above 70 in order to be eligible. While these 
examples show that the registration process was less than perfect, this is not surprising, both 
because of the limited administrative capacity and because everything happened very quickly. 
When it comes to distribution, the delivery of the pension benefit is done through the 
existing network of Post Offices (Ellis et al. 2009). Because of the migrant economy and its 
associated remittances, the post network in Lesotho is well built-out, and operating through it 
served to lower the costs of distribution. In some places, pay points are located in the offices 
of chiefs, in local schools or health centers. For the most remote mountain villages, an army 
helicopter is deployed to bring money and staff directly to the site in question (Hagen 2008). 
On payment day, all eligible pensioners collect their cash by going to the local pay point 
carrying their pension book, containing a photo ID (Ellis et al. 2009). For those who are too 
weak to make the trip, someone else can be sent in their place, provided that their photo is 
also included in the pension book, along with a letter of verification.  
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Collecting payments could be a source of difficulty for some. In more remote locations, 
the travelling time for the pensioner could be a hindrance to receiving the pension at all. 
According to the LPIG survey, 25% of pensioners reported that their travelling time to the pay 
point was more than one hour. This percentage could be expected to be higher for people in 
more remote areas than the Manonyane community council the survey was undertaken in, as 
distances are higher and transportation less accessible. Upon arriving to the pay point, there is 
a long queue of people waiting for their payment. Since most pensions are paid out on a single 
day, waiting times can be very long. The survey reports that 80% of the pensioners say that 
they usually have to wait for over 2 hours at the pay point. 
In some cases, the waiting period can be even longer. Tumelo, who picked up both his 
own, his wife’s and his sister’s pension, used the whole pension day travelling and waiting in 
the post office. He would leave his home at six o’clock in the morning, arrive at the pay point 
at 08.30 and be back home at 16.30. Limpho, a 78-year old woman living in a more remote 
village, spent two and a half hours walking each way to the pay point, in addition to waiting 
several hours to get the pension. It is obvious that long travelling times put an extra strain on 
the elderly, who might be in poor health to begin with. Some elderly lack the opportunity to 
pick it up at all, and therefore send a relative or neighbor to do it for them. This was the case 
for Palesa: even though the pay point was just a few minutes’ walk away, her health was such 
that she would rather send her daughter to pick up the pension. It is, however, most common 
for pensioner to pick up the pension on their own (Croome and Mapetla 2007). 
 From this, it is clear that there have been some difficulties associated with 
implementing the pension in administrative terms. These difficulties have included pensioners 
not getting their payments on time and failures to coordinate properly with other, existing 
social transfers, but on the whole the implementation of the pension scheme in Lesotho has 
been quite successful (Hagen 2008). Despite minor complaints from pensioners, the LPIG 
survey suggests that the satisfaction with the administration of the pension scheme is high, 75% 
of informants rating it as satisfactory or better. In addition, there are few delays in payment 
and the pension staff is treating the pensioners with respect.  
 These positive results have been achieved even in the absence of a long planning 
process, as the various challenges to the pension’s implementation have been solved 
successfully by building on existing power structures, utilizing existing registration 
infrastructure and distributing the pension through the pre-existing network of Post Offices. 
This follows the advice given by Smith and Subbarao (2003). Overall, the simple design of 
the transfer, such as the lack of a means-test, as well as having it replace other, more 
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piecemeal programs has meant that many of the problems connected to information and 
administration have been handled well.  
Taking into account all of the above, from the political process through questions 
connected to financing and to the practical problems of registering recipients and distributing 
the payments, the old age pension in Lesotho can be seen to meet those principles laid out by 
Hanlon et al. (2010), at least on administrative side. The various constraints connected to 
introducing social protection in developing countries have also been successfully managed.  
Recipients’ perception of the pension scheme 
Before turning to the actual impacts of the pension scheme, I want to assess how the 
pensioners themselves perceive it, specifically whether it is seen as a gift or as a right. If the 
elderly believe that the pension is simply charity, instead of a right, the way they spend it 
could be affected, for instance by saving more of it for the future, since they cannot always 
expect to receive a pension. 
It is informative to start by looking at the survey. Here it is reported that most 
pensioners see the pension as a right, and a majority also associate it with the government and 
that it is tax-funded. Furthermore, there is agreement in the survey’s sample that the 
government “can never stop the pension” and that the pension cannot be taken away from an 
individual while other people still receive it. Together, this suggests that the pension is indeed 
trusted as regular and reliable, which, as shown earlier, is very important when it comes to 
social transfers. This allows pensioners to spend the pension as they wish, with no need to 
save it to be prepared for a future cancellation of the whole pension payments. This is 
especially remarkable when considering that the survey was undertaken in April 2006, only a 
few months after the pension was fully implemented. By the time of my fieldwork, five years 
after the implementation, older people’s faith in the regularity of pension payments could be 
expected to be even stronger. Kelello emphasized this when she was asked about the 
importance of the pension, saying that it was something to trust. 
 However, other informants saw the pension as a gift. Thato did not want to comment 
on her satisfaction with the pension scheme because of this: since it was a gift, it did not 
matter whether she had complaints or whether she was satisfied. She also thought that the 
government could stop the pension if they wanted to, and there was nothing she could do 
about it, except go back to the way things were before. At the time of the interview, she had 
been receiving the pension for about one year. 
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 At the opposite end of the spectrum we find Tumelo, who firmly believed that the 
pension was a right for all elderly. He connected it to paying taxes through his working life, 
and now getting it back in the form of pensions. Similarly, Andrew connected the pension to 
having worked for a long time and “built the country”. Palesa also underlined her contribution 
to the country when asked why the elderly should receive a pension, stating that she had given 
birth to ten children and deserved to be taken care of in her old age. Limpho, on the other 
hand, saw it as a right based in the fact that the elderly are needy, and that the state should 
support them through their old age. She also compared the elderly in Lesotho to those in 
South Africa, where they have received the pension for a much longer time.  
There were a lot of different answers as to the source of the pension. As mentioned, 
Tumelo connected it to having paid taxes through his working lives, and now getting those 
back. Limpho pondered the possibility of it originating in the mercy of the Prime Minister, 
supporting the assertions made by Pelham (2007) above. Lipuo thought that the pension did 
not come from the government, but rather from international organizations. Similar confusion 
about the source of pensions is also documented in the LPIG survey, perhaps showing that the 
information work surrounding the pension has not been adequate in educating the pensioners 
on the mechanics of the scheme. This might also be the cause of why some of the elderly see 
the pension as a gift instead of a right. The speed of implementation and the lack of public 
participation in the debates before implementation may also be to blame for this. 
Nutritional impacts 
In the discussion on the impacts of social protection in other developing countries, it was 
suggested that one of the most common consequences of protection programs was improved 
nutrition. This was also underlined as one of the consequences of the South African pension 
scheme. Such an impact is not guaranteed, however, as a cash transfer would have to be 
substantial enough to effect such changes (Hanlon et al. 2010). In the context of Lesotho, 
Croome et al. (2007) estimate that at the prices prevailing in 2004, the pension amount (then 
M150) was enough to provide about four times the necessary food for an elderly person for a 
month, or three quarters of the necessary food for the average five-member household. 
Since this study was undertaken, however, prices have risen considerably. This can be 
exemplified by looking at the cost of the staple food: a 12,5kg bag of maize flour was M20 in 
2004 (Croome et al. 2007), but cost M50 during my fieldwork in 2011. This, then, puts the 
seemingly generous two-step increase in the pension amount from M150 to M300 in a 
different light, if prices have increased at the same or at a higher rate. Still, even at higher 
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prices, a pension income would be able to provide almost the same quantity of food as before, 
thanks to the increases in benefits. For pensioners living alone or in small households, the 
pension should be more than sufficient to provide enough food. It would also be able to 
comprise a large part of the food budget even for larger household. Nevertheless, the failure to 
connect the pension directly to the price index is one of the weaknesses of the Lesotho 
pension scheme, as it puts the transfer in danger of not being substantial enough if the prices 
continue to rise. While it has kept up with the price hikes so far, there is no guarantee of this 
happening if it is not explicitly linked to the price index. 
 In any case, food spending comprises an important part of pension spending in 
Lesotho as well. This is backed up by the existing empirical research: the LPIG survey found 
that 61% of the pensioners in their sample used the pension to buy more food than before, that 
the pensioners were now eating better and that they had more food security. Croome et al. 
(2007), which as mentioned deal specifically with hunger vulnerability, found that the number 
of pensioners who claimed to never or rarely have enough food to satisfy their hunger 
dropped from 80% to 40% after the pension was introduced. Among my informants food was 
also emphasized as the most common expense. Thabo, for instance, used most of his pension 
on food, buying meat, maize meal and wheat as well as salt and oil for cooking. Palesa and 
Maria also spent the pension almost exclusively on food. This shows that while the given 
amount is small, it is still sufficient to make a contribution to the household food budget.  
It is also illuminating to see how the pension has changed recipients’ food 
consumption, either by affecting the amount of food they purchase or the kind of food they 
purchase. With regards to the former, the pension’s effect on the amount of food purchased 
would be expected to be larger in poorer household, if there was not enough food previously. 
In the study from the Mountain Zone (Croome et al. 2007), where poverty is higher than in 
the other regions of Lesotho, it was found that while 80% of the pensioners said that they 
were always or sometimes hungry before receiving the pension, this was reduced to 52% after 
the implementation. In the LPIG survey, the respective numbers were 65% and 55%. Among 
the pensioners I interviewed, Palesa claimed that she was earlier unable to get enough food, 
and that she sometimes went hungry for two days. With the cash income represented by the 
pension, she was now able to sufficiently feed herself and her household, consisting of her 
daughter and grandchild. By observing her living conditions, it was apparent that her living 
standards were very poor, living in a dilapidated house without electricity and having the 
pension as her only cash income. Palesa’s situation shows how the nutritional impact of the 
pension scheme can make a big difference in the lowest-income households. 
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Another important point was here raised by Tseliso and Libuseng. In their opinion, the 
most important aspect of the pension was that it allowed them to even out income deficiencies 
when their children could not send money or before the harvest season. This is when money 
and food is scarcest, and when many households who are otherwise out of poverty and have 
enough to eat, fall back in. The pension can protect these households as well, letting them stay 
out of hunger even through this period. 
For the households who are better-off and already able to buy or grow enough food, 
the pension could be used to buy better food. In Lesotho, the staple food is maize and maize 
meal, and the main source of proteins is meat, beans or egg. Beans are the cheaper option, and 
thus more common. In the LPIG survey, it was found that almost three quarters of informants 
were eating meat more or much more often than before receiving their pensions. More than 40% 
were also eating beans more or much more often than before, and a list of some of the things 
that pensioners could now afford that they could not previously includes milk and egg, sugar 
and cakes and sweets. 
 The point about eating better can be exemplified by Mohale’s household. His son, who 
was the one who controlled the spending of the pension, said that the pension is mostly 
directed towards food spending, and that they are now able to afford better groceries than 
before, specifically eating more meat. Ketso echoed this statement, being able to eat meat for 
his meals more often now. Maria, who spent most of the pension money on food, mainly 
maize meal, wheat meal and meat, felt that she could get more food and better food with the 
pension benefit.  
In addition to adding more meat or proteins in general to their diet, pensioners could 
also spend the pension on “luxury” foods, goods that are not essential for a healthy diet, but 
nevertheless wanted by the pensioner. Such spending could only happen in those households 
that were better-off and where the pensioner could spend the pension money more freely. This 
was the case for Kellelo, who lived with her grandson and two great-grandchildren. The 
grandson worked as a contractor in the capital, and thus had a sizeable income compared to, 
for instance, Palesa’s household. This difference was apparent also by observing Kellelo’s 
living standards. While she reported that the pension was used for food items, she specified 
them as being sugar, tea, meat or apples. Of course, eating apples can hardly be classified as 
much of a luxury, but compared to Palesa’s household, who mainly bought maize meal, the 
difference is striking. This also shows the importance of having a work income, as Kellelo’s 
son had, and the difference it can make in the economic status of a household in Lesotho. 
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 The necessity of spending money on food is not only related to the income of the 
household, but also to the degree to which the household was able to grow their own 
foodstuffs. Again, better-off households could be expected to own more land and cattle, and 
thus need to buy less food, but it is here important to remember the relative lucrativeness of 
paid labor in relation to agriculture. Thus, households that were income-poor but owned lands 
and had the capacity to work them could spend less of the pension income on food.  
Teboho, a 78 year old man who lived with his wife, two children and seven 
grandchildren, was still actively involved in agriculture. He also owned some cattle and goats, 
and was able to provide the necessary food for the household in this way. As a consequence 
of this, he did not use much of the pension for food. This allowed him to prioritize other 
things, such as education expenses for the grandchildren, which will be discussed below. The 
income he got from selling wool or other products could be used for food purchases, but the 
pension was mainly used to buy non-food essentials or salt for the animals. Thus, Teboho did 
not fulfill the expectation of spending the majority of his pension on food. 
However, many elderly are no longer capable of plowing the earth themselves, or 
cultivating the fields extensively. For Teboho, this task was made simpler by the fact that he 
had two adult children living with him, who helped with the animals and the fields. For other 
pensioners, this was different. Maria, for instance, who previously relied on chickens or 
livestock for meat, did no longer own any cows and just a few chickens. Additionally, she 
could not work the fields as much as before, only cultivating a small patch of vegetables in 
her garden. Limpho also lamented that agriculture was more difficult now than what it used to 
be, independent from her having aged: 
“Life is not getting better. The life we were used to was to go to the fields and grow 
some things, but today’s climate is not good for our plants and our fields, so we are 
losing much (…) now, we will spend money on buying food from the shops, things like 
maize meal, because we don’t have any harvest in the field.” 
Another factor that has to be accounted for here is the location of the household. In urban 
areas, where most households lack the opportunity to grow food for household consumption, 
purchasing food is more of a necessity. Additionally, while water is plentiful and easily 
accessible in rural areas, it is more of a concern for urban dwellers. Pitso, a 77 year old man 
living in one of the urban areas near the capital with a household of 10 members, said that 
water was the most important household need. For him, the option to pay the monthly water 
fee was the most important consequence of the pension.  Regarding the lack of opportunity to 
work his own fields, Pitso claimed that life was easier when he lived in the mountains, where 
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he owned both fields and animals, but that he had to move nearer the city because of his 
wife’s health. With a two-pension income, and contributions from some of the other 
household members, they were, however, able to buy all the food and water they needed. 
The statements of Pitso, Maria and Limpho show how the pension has contributed to 
softening the blow from some of the losses that have been experienced in agriculture. In other 
words, the pension can allow pensioner households to maintain their nutritional levels even in 
the face of declining agricultural output, by letting them buy the things they would previously 
grow. Neither Maria nor Limpho had any problems in getting enough food for the household, 
despite the decline in the amount of food they got from their own fields. Through ageing, 
moving or through climate, many pensioners have lost the ability to grow their own food and 
the pension has helped them sustain their consumption levels of food. It should be noted, 
however, that this decline in the nutritional self-sufficiency of households will probably lessen 
the impact of the pension on other aspects of life, such as health or education, since it is now 
largely consumed by food expenditures. 
In sum, it is clear that changes in food spending and nutritional status are indeed 
important consequences of the old age pension in Lesotho, just as it has been in association 
with social protection in other places in the developing world. While most of Lesotho is rural 
and most households have access to fields, many households are still dependent on buying 
food for consumption, for a variety of reasons. Households containing pensioners might be 
more vulnerable to this, as their capacity to perform manual labor might be smaller. The 
change in nutrition might be a matter of eating better, e.g. eating more proteins, but for the 
poorest households it might even be the difference between going hungry and having enough 
food. Purchasing more or better food can also be expected to benefit all the members of the 
households, especially children and thus significantly contribute to a better life for poor 
households. In sum, it seems that the pension scheme can live up to one of the main functions 
of social protection as laid out by Barrientos and Hulme (2008), namely protecting basic 
levels of consumption among the poor. 
Health impacts 
In addition to improving nutrition, another common consequence of social transfers was 
bettering the health status of recipients or other household members. Of course, better health 
is connected to better nutrition, and when the pension income is spent on food for the whole 
household, it should have a health impact for all members on its own. In addition to this, 
however, a cash transfer can give its recipient the opportunity to visit health clinics more 
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often or buy medicines. This effect is most pronounced when the transfer is given on the 
precondition of visiting clinics, but was, for instance, also found as a significant consequence 
of the South African pension. This is not unexpected, considering the age of recipients and 
their general health status. As mentioned in the chapter on old age in developing countries, 
poor health is a significant source of vulnerability among the elderly, and can greatly increase 
their chance of falling into poverty. If the pension scheme can be said to protect or improve 
the health of recipients, then, it can be said to have an impact on poverty and vulnerability.  
The LPIG survey revealed that 50% of respondents spent more on health services after 
getting the pension. Here, the most highly prioritized services were to go more often to the 
hospital or clinic, and the second most prioritized was buying more medicines. Increased 
expenditure on health was a phenomenon that could also be seen among my informants. 
Considering that my collection of informants had an average age of almost 80, it is perhaps 
not surprising that a number of medical issues were reported. 
Lipuo said that being able to go to the doctor was the most important change she had 
experienced after she started receiving the pension. She estimated spending around M150 per 
month for visiting the doctor, which she was now able to do every month. She recounted an 
experience from before the pension scheme, where she had to sell some of her clothes in order 
to visit the doctor because she did not have sufficient cash. Andrew also stated that the ability 
to visit the doctor was the most important consequence of the pension scheme. If he did not 
have the pension, he would still be taken care of by his family, who lived nearby, and would 
not want for things like food or clothing. He did appreciate the opportunity of going to the 
doctor, though, even without having specific medical complaints. If he felt he needed to see 
the doctor, he could now do it, without having to ask for money from his relatives. 
 One informant even prioritized health expenses above food expenditure. Living on her 
own, Thato said that the food she ate was the same as before and that she still did not have as 
much as she wanted. While she did use the pension to buy maize meal, she still felt the 
amount was too small to improve her nutrition. Instead, she visited the doctor and paid for 
medications monthly. She herself suspected that she might have had breast cancer for around 
a year, and the pension afforded her the opportunity to get regular check-ups. Spending 
money on health was more important to her than improved nutrition. 
 Since my field interviews were with pensioners and not with other household members, 
I do not have the data to say anything about whether the health status of the whole household 
has improved. The pensioners I interviewed who said that they spent money on health did not 
mention spending it on any other household members, but this does not mean they had not or 
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would not do this. In the theory section it was noted that in the case of South Africa, 
households where the pension income was spent as any other household income experienced a 
marked improvement in all household members’ health status, so there is reason to suspect the 
same is the case in Lesotho. Thus, while the elderly are in need of more regular check-ups 
because of their age, other household members might also have the opportunity to spend some 
of the pension income on seeing the doctor if they needed to. 
 While the ability to go see the doctor more often might seem trivial, Palesa underlined 
its importance. When asked to compare the situation for elderly today with the situation for 
her own parents in the last stage of their lives, Palesa emphasized the ability to get medical 
attention as one of the clear improvements. Her grandmother, who worked in the fields until a 
very short time before she passed away, did not have access to such services. It is clear that 
Palesa perceived the opportunity to see the doctor as extending her life and also providing 
more comfort in old age than was available to previous generations. Palesa herself spent a-
round M50 of the pension on health expenses, a considerable amount taking her living condit-
ions into account. This reflects the value she placed on being able to take care of her health. 
 From these first two sections, it is plain that the health and nutritional impacts of the 
pension can be considerable, as illustrated by different informants in different life situations. 
For those who have very little, the pension can provide them with the basic necessities that 
they previously lacked, and it can also improve their life by allowing them to properly take 
care of their health. For those who have a little more, the pension is still valued as a source of 
extra comfort or security. Seeing as how hunger and poor health are known characteristics of 
poverty, it is clear how the pension scheme can live up to the definition of social protection 
given previously, by “protect[ing] against low or declining living standards arising out of a 
number of basic risks and needs” (Van Ginneken 2003b: 36), and by “reducing the impact on 
the household budget of the cost for basic needs and capabilities” (Van Ginneken 2003a: 11). 
In addition, it is already apparent that the pension can have impacts both on the household 
level, by improving nutrition, and for the recipients, by allowing them to take care of their 
health more than before. 
Impacts on productivity and investments 
I turn now to the second function of social protection presented in Barrientos and Hulme 
(2008: 4), namely “facilitating investment in human and other productive assets” so that the 
recipient household can escape poverty. While the previous two sections have dealt with the 
reduction of poverty and vulnerability through the ability to spend more money on food and 
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health, I will here examine to which degree the pension is capable of having larger-scale eff-
ects as well. The hopeful end result of such effects is more economic growth and there are a 
number of mechanisms through which this could happen. Here, I will briefly discuss in-
creasing productivity, before moving on to fuelling local markets and increasing investments. 
 To begin with, it should be pointed out that better nutrition and better health improves 
productivity in itself. It is clear from the above that these expenditures are prioritized by the 
pension recipients, and thus this effect could be expected also in Lesotho, even if none of my 
informants mentioned it. This is potentially beneficial for the economy in the long run, for 
instance if children brought up in pensioner households lead longer and healthier lives, as 
evidence from South Africa suggests, and it is also beneficial for those households with 
access to wage employment. 
 Another way in which the pension can aid productivity is by enabling migration. 
When discussing the contribution of older people in developing world contexts, it was 
mentioned that the elderly can play a part in performing household tasks, which in turn could 
release other household members to take employment, even migrating in order to do so. 
Married pensioners Tseliso and Libuseng, who lived with their grandchildren, had a daughter 
working in Bloemfontein in South Africa. The daughter would send money every month, but 
the security the pension afforded allowed her to keep working in South Africa and enabled her 
parents to take care of their grandchildren. Of course, when the pension makes cross-border 
migration possible, it is not beneficial for the national economy, but the small size of Lesotho 
and its migration-based economy leave little room for employment elsewhere. Still, one pen-
sioner I interviewed had a daughter working in Maseru, so internal migration also takes place. 
 A possible negative consequence of social transfers was discussed briefly in the theory: 
it might give recipients incentives to stop working. This would lower productivity and 
economic activity. While this was countered with evidence from developing countries with 
transfer schemes showing the contrary, and also by showing how older people in developing 
countries wish to work even into old age, it might still be a possibility. Among my informants, 
Palesa said that she stopped working after starting to receive the pension. Previously, she 
would occasionally make simple foods and sell them by the road, but she no longer felt she 
needed to do this after she got regular income from the pension.  There is reason to suspect 
that Palesa represents an exception here, as she lived in a household small enough to get by 
with only the pension income. Additionally, her business was very small-scale and thus of 
little economic value to anyone but Palesa’s own household. It is also hard to argue against 
her giving up work like this, considering she was currently 83 years old and in poor health. 
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While the pension scheme might let some pensioners stop working, then, it is difficult to 
accept this as a “negative consequence” of the pension scheme. Rather, it shows how elderly 
people’s declining ability to work, a significant source of vulnerability and poverty in old age, 
can be ameliorated by implementing a pension scheme. 
 The more direct potential impacts on the economy are those that deal with increased 
economic activity on the local scale and increased opportunity to save and invest for 
pensioner households. Such effects would certainly be beneficial for the economy on a large 
scale, and would be a great advantage for any social protection program: Lindert’s (2004) 
Free-Lunch Puzzle, in which social spending has enough beneficial economic consequences 
to pay for itself shows the potential value of this. Above, it was theorized that social transfers 
could provide poor people with the money to invest as well as the confidence to invest, 
through being assured income. The kinds of investments that have been made in other count-
ries with transfer schemes include buying farm implements, agricultural inputs or house im-
provements. Recipients could also save money to buy assets in the future or have as insurance 
against emergencies. On top of this, the influx of money into local economies caused by 
implementing a social transfer, can serve to fuel local entrepreneurship, and create beneficial 
spirals for local businesses. This latter point was also connected to greater equality, since 
shifting consumption towards lower-income households tend to result in more local spending. 
These economic effects may look plausible in theory, but wide-reaching economic 
growth effects from a social transfer can often be a rather tall order. In the case of Lesotho, 
there are several reasons why this might not happen. First and perhaps most important is the 
fact that the amount given is so small. The M300 pensioners are given is, as we have seen, 
enough to feed an average household of five for three quarters of a month, and it is perhaps 
unreasonable to expect identifiable macro-economic consequences from this rather meager 
amount, either in terms of increased investments or of more vital local economies. 
Looking at the market impacts of the pension supports this suspicion. Previously, two 
sets of impacts of injecting money into local economies were laid out. First, this could 
stimulate local demand and, in turn, economic activity, and second, this could cause prices to 
rise and drive inflation. While I myself was unable to talk to any local store owners or others 
who might have experienced a boost after the pension scheme was implemented, Ellis et al. 
(2009) assess the market effects of the old age pension. According to them, the impacts on 
markets in Lesotho has been small, both because of the size of the transfer and because of the 
country’s integration into the larger economy of South Africa. The latter results in “a high 
propensity even in remote rural areas to purchase goods imported from South Africa” (Ellis et 
87 
 
al. 2009: 158), and thus reduces the local and national economic impact of the pension 
scheme. On the plus side, this market integration also stops the pension from causing inflation, 
avoiding a potentially negative impact. Still, the high level of market integration diffuses 
some of the potential of the pension scheme to impact local economic activity, since it 
counteracts the impact of shifting consumption towards lower-income households and 
increasing equality. Here, I should reiterate that I was not able to visit the more remote areas 
of the country, where it is more probable for the pension to have had these kinds of effects. 
What about the pension scheme’s impact on saving or investment in Lesotho? Again, 
the size of the pension is enough to generate pessimism on part of wider economic impacts, 
but there is also another reason for why the pension might not lead to increased saving and 
investing, namely the characteristics of the pensioners themselves. Expecting pensioners to 
save or invest much money may be asking too much: they are in the last stage of their lives 
and might not see the point of setting aside funds, especially in situations where they are 
living on the brink of poverty, and where there are unmet basic needs. It is understandable 
then, that consumption takes priority over saving and investing.  
Then again, this idea was argued against by my informants. Thato, for instance, said 
that she would like to be able to purchase some cows and other animals, and that her relatives 
would remember her well because the livestock could remain with them when she herself had 
passed away. Pensioners who attach importance to their legacy in this way are more likely to 
want to save and invest their money, despite the fact that they themselves might not be around 
to reap the benefits. The degree to which the pension is saved or invested is thus worth 
exploring, and I asked all my informants whether they saved or had invested some of their 
pension. Additionally, I asked them what they would do if the pension amount was higher, to 
see if it was the amount itself that potentially restricted them from saving or investing. 
Looking at the LPIG survey seems to confirm the negative view of the pension’s 
impact on saving and investing: only six pensioners said that some of their pension had gone 
towards starting a new business or expanding an existing one, and only 16 respondents said 
they were able to save any part of the pension. Nyanguru (2007), further exploring this issue, 
notes that while some wage-paying jobs had been created, this job creation is limited to the 
household now being able to pay domestic helps or farm workers in cash where they earlier 
had paid them in kind. He theorizes that the reason for the failure to invest the pension is the 
general perception in Lesotho of agriculture as unprofitable and risky. Again, this can be con-
nected to the fact that imported foods from South Africa are generally cheaper than what can 
be produced domestically, thus giving little incentive to expand the involvement in agriculture. 
88 
 
 Still, for the majority of people living in Lesotho, the only real area presenting 
investment opportunities is agriculture. This is because most people live in rural areas, and 
most households are in possession of some fields and have traditionally grown them for 
subsistence. For those pensioner households who want to invest, then, most obvious option is 
agriculture. This idea is supported by the LPIG survey, where all the six new businesses that 
were started as a consequence of the pension scheme were in the agricultural sector. 
Examining the pension’s impact on investment in agriculture is therefore still valuable. 
Thato expressed a clear wish to expand her involvement in agriculture. She lived alone, 
her husband and daughter having died some years previously, and was currently only growing 
vegetables in her garden for her own consumption. Earlier, the household made money by 
selling firewood and crops, but there was now no longer anyone working the fields. The 
animals were also dead, and there was not enough money to either invest in livestock or to 
hire workers to plough and work the fields. With more money, Thato would buy cows and 
pay someone to work her land, but she clearly felt that the pension amount was much too 
small to save anything and spend for this purpose. 
 While Thato lived alone, and thus had only the income from the pension to rely on, 
some other households were able to convert the pension payment to successfully invest in 
agriculture. This was the case for Tumelo’s and Lipuo’s household, two married pensioners 
who were living with Tumelo’s sister, also a pensioner. Every month, they would save some 
of the money from their pensions so that they could rent a tractor in the beginning of the 
agricultural season to plough their fields. The household owned three fields, and renting a 
tractor to plough them all would cost almost M1200, or the equivalent of four months’ 
individual pensions. With their three-pension income, however, they were able to afford this, 
and could therefore sell their produce (maize) in June, returning a profit on their investment. 
 The contrast between Thato on the one hand and Tumelo and Lipuo on the other, 
shows that while the pension might be insufficient on its own to encourage investment in 
agriculture, households with more than one pensioner, and thus higher incomes, would be 
better situated to undertake such investments. Household income is not the only determinant 
here; there is also the question of having the available manpower to work the fields. For both 
of the mentioned households, there was not enough manpower inside the household to work 
the fields effectively, as they were both pensioner-only, and they were thus dependent on 
paying other people to do the work. In households where there is available manpower, the 
cost of investing in agriculture would be smaller, if one assumes that household members are 
not paid in cash for their work. 
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 An example of the latter point is provided by Teboho, whose situation I have already 
discussed above. Since he had manpower available inside the household Teboho did not have 
to hire outside labor, something he could not have afforded. Instead, he could spend some of 
his pension on buying agricultural inputs, a common field of investment for transfer recipients 
in other developing countries as well. Specifically, Teboho purchased salt for his animals. 
Teboho’s situation, as well as the situations of Tumelo and Lipuo and Thato shows some 
different preconditions for investing in agriculture. 
Outside directly investing in agriculture as in the previous examples, another form of 
investment is asset building. Asset building from social transfers can include buying farm 
implements or livestock. Other examples of asset building include spending money on 
children’s education, which will be dealt with below, and I will here concentrate on investing 
in productive assets. 
The importance of livestock in rural Lesotho is very high, and one might therefore 
assume that using the pension to invest in livestock would be a priority for many. This 
importance can for instance be illustrated by Teboho, whose goats gave him some cash 
income and whose cattle could be used for plowing the fields. Thato, as shown above, 
expressed a clear wish to invest in livestock, but again the pension was insufficient for such 
expenses. The estimated price of livestock ranges from M350 for a goat to M 4000 to M6000 
for a cow, the latter being more than a whole year’s pension. Barring the very few elderly who 
are able to save the entirety of their pension for several months in a row, it is near impossible 
to convert the pension into livestock assets.  
Of the pensioners I interviewed, the only clear-cut example of investing the pension 
directly in productive assets was provided by Lerato. Lerato lived with her son in an urban 
neighborhood just outside the capital. The son worked as a teacher and the household clearly 
enjoyed comparatively high living standards, significantly better off than my other informants. 
The comfort of her living situation, as well as the kindness of her son, allowed her to spend 
the pension exactly as she wanted to. She had utilized this freedom by spending her pension 
on fulfilling her dream of keeping chickens. With some of the pension saved up, she bought a 
small chicken coop and several chickens. It is telling, but perhaps not surprising, that this 
happens in one of the better-off and urban households, while the poorer rural households did 
not have the opportunity to make a similar investment.  
While building assets might be outside the reach for most pensioners, the pension can 
serve as a form of insurance for already existing assets, as discussed by Ellis et al. (2009). 
Teboho said that if he did not have the pension income, he might have been forced to sell off 
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some of his livestock in order to raise cash for various household expenses. For households 
dependent on income from agriculture or livestock, in its nature irregular and insecure, having 
the regular pension income can make a very important contribution, even if it is a relatively 
small sum.  
  What about the degree to which informants saved their money? This was found as 
common in South Africa, but the situation in Lesotho is different. Above, it was shown how 
Tumelo and Lipuo saved some of their pension money to invest in agriculture. Mohale 
expressed the wish to save to have in case of some emergency, but felt he was unable to do 
this because of the small amount given. One informant, Pitso, used some of the money from 
the pension to join a burial society, an informal insurance mechanism where money from 
participants is pooled and used to pay for their burial when they die. This is clearly a way of 
saving, and also has some insurance effect. Such burial societies are relatively common in 
Lesotho, and Lerato also stated that she used some of the pension on monthly fees for the 
burial society. Still, such saving is very small-scale, unlikely to have large-scale consequences. 
 The different examples presented here seem to point in one direction: the pension is 
simply not large enough to effect long-term economic changes. For the poorest households, 
there is little chance of setting aside any amount after purchasing basic necessities, and even 
lower chance of converting this into productive assets. The examples given from better-off 
households, households with access to steady paid work or with more than one pension 
income, show that asset creation and agricultural investments are possible, but these situations 
are likely to be exceptions in Lesotho, and thus not enough to produce a wider set of 
economic changes for the populace. This also shows the contrast to the pension scheme in 
South Africa, where the pension is more substantial and pensioners have better access to 
banking services. 
 Then again, the Parliamentary discussions on the pension never mentioned increased 
investment or economic growth as part of the rationale for implementing the pension scheme. 
The fact that it is directed at citizens beyond working age should also dampen the 
expectations of  long-term economic consequences (Ellis et al. 2009). The interpretation by 
Nyanguru (2007) that failure to invest is caused by a lack of faith in agriculture might also 
have some merit, at least in the case of poorer households, where the risk of such investments 
simply makes it not worthwhile. In sum, then, the macro-economic consequences of the 
Lesotho pension scheme seem to be lacking. 
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Educational impacts 
As mentioned above, spending money on education can be understood as investing in human 
capital, and thus a form of asset building. It has also been discussed how an increase in enroll-
ment rates is a common consequence of social transfers in other countries, even when the 
transfer is not based on any such conditions. Such an increase, of course, depends on the 
values and priorities of the transfer recipients. 
In the LPIG survey, 60% of pensioner households contained children who were 
attending school, the large majority of them in primary education, showing how common such 
co-residence is. The fact that children and older people often co-reside was used as an 
argument for the pension, in saying that it would reach more than one vulnerable group, 
bettering the life of children as well as that of the elderly. While spending money on 
improving the food consumed by the household is a clear improvement also for children, 
increasing the money spent on education is another. Education spending, as an investment, 
could also end up benefiting the household in the long run, by enabling the children to get 
higher-paid jobs when they grow up. It should be noted that while primary education is free in 
Lesotho, there are still considerable costs connected to schooling, specifically in paying for 
transportation and buying uniforms, school books and stationary, and the pension could play a 
role in meeting these costs (Croome and Mapetla 2007). 
An informant who lived alone with school-age children was Maria, whose household 
consisted of her and four great-grandchildren attending school. Despite this, she did not feel 
she spent a lot of money on education, only buying clothes for the children when they needed 
it. Pensioners Tseliso and Libuseng, who lived with two orphaned grandchildren, spent M400-
500 on food every month, but saved whatever was left over to spend on education-related 
expenses. Both of their grandchildren were in primary school, so the expenses were only 
connected to clothing and materials. The children were also sent to school with packed 
lunches, which the couple regarded as a part of education spending.  
The informant who attached the greatest importance to education was Teboho. He 
lived in a large household containing six grandchildren, and the pension was the only regular 
cash income. As already mentioned, the household grew their own food and Teboho spent 
little on his own health, preferring to spend as much of the pension as he could on any school-
related expenses. If one of his grandchildren said they needed a pen for school, he would buy 
that. These small items might seem unimportant or trivial, but living off the land like 
Teboho’s household often means going large portions of the year without a cash income, and 
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the opportunity to buy such small things is thus very valuable. For Teboho, this was 
especially true when it comes to expenses related to education: 
“I find [these small things] very important, because education is important these days. 
That’s why I’m investing in it. Even though I know that as time goes on this money will 
not be enough to take them to higher education. So at least if they know how to read 
and write, it will be better. I will have done something for them.” 
While he himself did not have any education, he clearly valued it, and his priorities show that 
the pension can indeed contribute to children attending school, even if the amount is small. 
Teboho’s faith in education might not be matched by many other pensioners, which shows 
how the pensioner himself influences the outcomes of the pension scheme. Teboho considers 
education to be very important, and thus his pension payment will go towards promoting the 
education of his grandchildren. This highlighting of the individual nature of pension spending 
is an important point. Of course, with a small amount, the impact of individual preferences 
will be smaller, as basic needs take priority over other preferences. But for those households 
or pensioners who already have a satisfying living standard, this impact becomes clearer. 
In the case of secondary education, the picture is somewhat bleaker. Teboho, with all 
his faith in education, would prioritize sending his grandchildren into further education, but 
felt he needed a larger pension if this were to happen. Libuseng also expressed the wish to 
keep the grandchildren in school past primary education, but again was hindered by the small 
size of the pension benefit, saying this was dependent on a pension increase or a larger 
contribution from their own children. Pitso’s household contained several children who 
attended secondary education, but this was made possible through the support of family 
members living outside the household. This shows how the fees in higher education preclude 
children from going if the pension is the only reliable cash income of the household. 
 In sum, it seems apparent that the pension can contribute to children attending school 
in Lesotho as well. This depends, however, on the pensioner’s prioritizations as well as the 
availability of education. It can be safely assumed that the fact that primary education is free 
allows a lot more children to attend school, even if there are still costs attached to schooling. 
This shows how a broad approach to social development can bear fruits: while the pension on 
its own might have been insufficient, the pension combined with fee-removal or –reduction 
can be expected to have a greater effect. This is, of course, also true when it comes to other 
societal areas, such as the health care sector, and illustrates the value of implementing social 
protection instead of simply implementing a cash transfer. A broader approach can give more 
wide-reaching consequences. 
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Sharing with the household 
In the discussion on old age in developing countries above, it was mentioned that older people 
tend to share their pension with the household. Therefore, a pension scheme could be 
expected to benefit several different people, not just the recipient or the elderly as a group. 
This was also discussed in conjunction with the fact that many elderly, co-reside with their 
grandchildren, and it was one of the findings from the evaluations of the South African 
pension scheme. The value of implementing a pension seems even higher when the fact that it 
can reach grandchildren is taken to account, especially when considering that many of these 
grandchildren are orphaned by HIV/AIDS. In Lesotho, the migration-based economy also 
contribute to the fact that children and their grandparents are often co-residing, further 
strengthening the expectations of impacting this group. 
From the above sections, especially in considering the nutritional and educational 
impacts of the pension scheme in Lesotho, it should already be obvious that the pension is not 
exclusively used on the pensioner receiving the money. Instead, it is often distributed to the 
rest of the household through for instance food expenditures. This vindicates the view many 
take towards the pensions as being a household transfer, and can satisfy the expectations of 
many to the Lesotho pension scheme having broader impacts than just helping older people. 
Still, even if the pension has already been shown to be shared among household members, 
exploring the pensioners’ attitudes towards sharing their pension with the whole household is 
important. Such an exploration can uncover different reasons for sharing and different 
methods of doing it, giving us a greater insight into intra-household mechanics.  
For some pensioners, sharing with the household is a non-issue because they are its 
only adult member. This was the case for both Maria and Tseliso and Libuseng, as shown 
before. For these pensioners, spending the money on themselves is unthinkable, as they have 
grandchildren to take care of. In these cases, sharing the pension would mean simply buying 
food for the whole household, and attend to other needs if possible. For pensioners living 
alone, or with other pensioners, the situation is the same.  
But other informants, who lived as parts of a larger household, also chose to spend it 
to the benefit of everyone, and for many it was equally unthinkable not to do this. Kelello 
would use the pension to buy the clothes for the children in her household, even though her 
grandson worked and the household had a comfortable income. Thabo, likewise, spent his 
pension as household money, not spending any of it exclusively on himself. Teboho, as 
quoted above, greatly prioritized education for his grandchildren, and chose to spend less on 
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his own health. Mohale saw it as his duty to provide for his grandchildren, and help his son 
raise them. As he was unable to do much manual work anymore to make his own money, the 
pension afforded him the option to contribute. 
In some cases, the pension is shared with family members outside the household as 
well. On pension day, Mohale gave most of his pension to his son, leaving it up to him to 
spend the money. While the son stated that the extra income had not led to major changes, 
being spent on small items like soap or matches, he also said that it had let him keep 
supporting Mohale’s orphan grandson, who was attending a boarding school in a different 
location, by sending him some money every month and paying any associated fees. Thus, the 
pension does not only help the immediate household, but could also be extended to family 
members outside the household who are in need of assistance. Mohale considered the 
opportunity to contribute to the household, and especially the orphaned grandson, as the most 
important impact of the pension scheme. 
 Another example of using the pension to help non-household members can be found in 
the case of Limpho. Her only living daughter was recently widowed and living in Maseru 
with an infant child, and Limpho would send M100 to the daughter every month, taken from 
the pension. Her daughter’s difficult situation made Limpho want to help in any way she 
could, and sharing her pension money was the least she could do. Here, it should be noted that 
Limpho lived with her youngest son, who worked in the local store. This put the household in 
a stronger economic position, which in turn gave Limpho more leeway to give away a portion 
of her pension. This again shows how better-off households can spend less on what they have 
to spend money on and more on what they wish to spend money on. For Limpho as well as 
Mohale, the opportunity to help a family member was the change she most appreciated from 
receiving the pension money. This illustrates the willingness among the pensioners to share 
the money they receive every month. 
This latter point is even better illustrated by looking at Lerato’s household. As 
described above, Lerato had considerable freedom, and stated that she used the pension for 
those things she wanted – like clothes or kitchen items. She had also, as mentioned, invested 
in a small chicken coop, fulfilling her wish to raise and sell chickens. In addition, she used 
part of the monthly amount to join a burial society. She did this so that she did not have to be 
a burden to her children after her passing – a contribution to the household, in a way. Still, 
this is a rare example of a pensioner who really does spend the whole amount on herself, not 
out of greed, but because she can. A situation like this is, of course, will only occur in the 
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better-off households, where all basic needs are comfortably taken care of, and the pension 
money works more as a monthly allowance than the only reliable cash income.  
Lerato’s situation is likely to be an outlier – just as it was in the section on investments 
– as most elderly cannot afford to spend the pension exactly as they please. There is much 
support for the idea that the elderly spend the pension as household money, though, and that it 
can, indeed, reach vulnerable groups apart from just the pensioners. Among the pensioners I 
interviewed, this was self-evident, and there was little resistance to giving up the pension for 
the good of the household. This sense of duty and responsibility shows clearly how a pension 
can benefit a whole household, more than other transfers might. 
Respect for the elderly and influence in the household 
Having examined the first two of the three functions of social protection according to 
Barrientos and Hulme (2008), I will now see how the pension can fulfill the third: 
strengthening the agency of those in poverty. Agency is a complex term, and can be used in 
many different contexts. Eating better, for instance, can be said to improve agency, since it 
allows people to be more productive or spend less time finding food. Without going further 
into these complexities I will here concentrate on examining two interconnected aspect of 
pensioners’ agency: how has the pension affected the respect and the influence afforded to the 
elderly? Both influence and respect are related to agency, and could be expected to change as 
a consequence of the pension. 
I have previously discussed how processes like urbanization are undermining informal 
support mechanisms for the elderly. This can also diminish the respect for older people, as 
well as decrease the financial and practical support that the elderly depend on from their 
children or other relatives. Respect for the elderly is also closely tied to the contribution they 
are able to make to the household. For older people, the loss of the ability to work and 
contribute financially to the household could mean that they lose some of their influence, 
becoming dependents instead of providers. I have already discussed how poverty among the 
elderly is characterized by isolation, powerlessness and low self-esteem, all of which are 
connected to their role in the household and the amount of respect they get both in the family 
and in the greater community. 
 The pension can be thought to counteract both declining respect for the elderly and 
reduced influence in the household. For one thing, the access to the pension would make the 
pensioner a valuable asset for a household as a source of regular cash. In turn, this could lead 
to the pensioner being a more valued household member, and possibly increasing the intra-
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household allocation of resources in favor of the older person. Reducing the dependence of 
older people in this way would be a major contribution by the pension scheme, and it is also 
one of the things that were underlined in the Parliamentary debate before the pension scheme 
was introduced, specifically aiming at reducing the marginalization of the elderly from society. 
Giving older people a separate income could certainly help in making them more independent 
and self-sufficient, increasing their agency. 
 With these issues in mind, I always asked how my informants perceived the level of 
respect for older people, in general and in the local community, as well as if this situation had 
changed any since the introduction of the pension scheme. When asking about the pensioner’s 
influence in the household, I made sure to ask whether the pensioner, upon receiving his 
pension, decided what to do with it himself. A voiced concern before pension distribution 
started was that the money would be taken away from the pensioner by other household 
members, and that the pensioner himself would have little say in how the money is spent 
(Croome and Mapetla 2007). If this were true, the pension would lead to little independence 
for the elderly, and would be unlikely to impact their agency in any significant way. 
 Among my informants, there was not much complaining about a lack of respect towards the 
elderly. While Tumelo complained that some Basotho did not respect the elderly properly, he 
himself had not experienced it, and felt he was well respected in his village. Similarly, Andrew 
lamented the fact that younger generations were more egotistical and less community-oriented, but 
he was very happy with the way he was treated, both by family members and by the greater 
community. In Palesa’s opinion, the elderly are more respected now than they were before, 
emphasizing the fact that they could now support children in school, which led to this increase in 
respect. On the other hand, Kelello stated that there has been no change in the level of respect, and 
that she was still receiving a lot of help from other people in her village, such as fetching water. 
 Regarding the question of whether or not the pensioner controlled the spending of the 
pension on his own, I can again turn to the LPIG survey. Here, only 5% of respondents stated 
that they left the control of the pension in its entirety to someone else. A smaller portion yet 
(only two respondents) stated that they were unhappy with this situation, i.e. they did it 
unwillingly. Mohale was one of my informants who chose to give his pension away to his son, 
keeping only a small part for himself and letting the son decide how to spend it. In Palesa’s 
household, her son visited on pension day, and decided how to spend the money. Neither 
Mohale nor Palesa complained about this way of managing their pensions, however, and 
seemed happy with the arrangement. 
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In other cases, the pensioner fully controlled the spending of the pension. In situations 
where the pensioner is the undisputed head of the household, as in the cases of Teboho and 
Maria, this finding is not surprising. In other households, such as for Kelello and Thabo, the 
pensioner was not head of household, but still decided how to spend the pension money: In 
these cases, then, the pension was clearly seen as the pensioners money, and it was up to him 
to spend it on the household or not. As seen above, the pension was, indeed, spent as 
household money in these cases. These examples, as well as the findings from the LPIG 
survey, show how respect for older people is still present in Lesotho, and also show how the 
pensioner has some influence even in households where he is not the head. 
There were different feelings connected to the influence afforded by the pension 
among the pensioners I interviewed. Mohale, as has already been mentioned, greatly 
appreciated the opportunity to help his son care for the grandchildren and thus contribute to 
the household, feeling that the money definitely gave him influence. Mohale’s son confirmed 
that his father now had more influence in the household, but emphasized that the respect for 
him was the same as before. Ketso felt that the money made him more independent, and 
valued the pension for this. Still, he added that it was better when he was able to work, but 
with the pension he was at least able to buy some things he wanted for himself. Similarly, 
Kelello said that the pension had led to more peace in the family, as she did not have to ask 
her grandson for money for all her needs like she used to before.  
Together, this shows that the pension is indeed capable of empowering the elderly, 
strengthening their agency and combating their loss of influence in the household. When a 
pensioner controls the pension money himself, he can support the household, no longer 
feeling powerless or as a burden. This can greatly diminish some of the psychological aspects 
of old age poverty. In addition, the pensioner no longer has to ask for money, since he has a 
separate source of income. This will do much to combat feelings of powerlessness. Of course, 
household show different results here, but it is clear that the pension can contribute in this 
way. In this way, the pension can serve to support the family structures that take care of the 
elderly in Lesotho, avoiding any issues of “crowding out” familial support (Nyanguru 2007). 
Summary 
In this chapter, I have examined the process of implementation and the impacts of the old age 
pension scheme in Lesotho. The pension as implemented very rapidly, due to unique political 
circumstances. The pension amount and the age of eligibility were used to limit the cost of the 
program, but this had consequences for its impact on poverty. Registration and distribution 
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issues were solved in practical way. When it comes to impacts, food spending was a high 
priority among my informants. Some also spent more money on health than they had 
previously. In terms of investments, the results were poorer, as the amount given is very small, 
and productive investments were only possible in a few cases. The only kind of investment 
which can be identified as a common consequence was spending money on sending children 
to school. This also reflects another of the pension’s important aspect, namely that it is shared 
across households. It can also be seen to raise the influence of the elderly, improving their life 
situation through giving them more of a say. 
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7. Conclusions 
In this thesis, I have examined issues relating to social protection in developing countries. I 
have looked at the ideas supporting it as well as various constraints to implementation, and 
used the old age pension scheme in Lesotho to consider these questions in a concrete setting. 
The research question I set out to answer was this: 
How has the Lesotho pension scheme been implemented, and what conse-
quences can be identified? 
In addition, there were a number of sub-questions, referring to how Lesotho has overcome 
constraints, why a pension scheme was chosen, and which groups have benefited from the 
pension scheme. 
 It is obvious that the Lesotho old age pension is capable of having an impact on 
poverty. This has happened through improving nutritional status of recipient households, and 
allowing them to take better care of their health. My field results have shown how this 
happens differently in different households, but it is still a consistent finding. It is not 
surprising that the bulk of pension spending goes towards food, as it is a high priority for poor 
households, and can have a great impact on the people’s well-being. The same goes for 
spending money on health, which is of particular importance to the elderly, who often 
experience medical issues. Both of these impacts are in line with the consequences identified 
from social transfers in numerous other countries, and also the impacts from the pension 
scheme in South Africa. This underlines the fact that social protection can serve to help 
recipients fulfill their basic needs, and that this is what people prioritize if they start to receive 
a transfer. 
 Another positive finding is that these impacts are not limited to the elderly as a group. 
My field results contained several examples of how the elderly see it as their task to provide 
for the household, even if the pension is “their” money. This shows that older people do 
indeed share their pensions with the whole household, an argument that was raised in favor of 
implementing pension schemes. In prioritizing between different social protection initiatives, 
this is an important observation, especially since it is not necessarily true in the case of other 
kinds of transfers. 
 It should be noted, however, that both of these impacts are dependent on the 
characteristics of each household. When it comes to food purchasing, for instance, the poorest 
household are likely to experience a significant improvement in nutrition, even lifting them 
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out of hunger, while better-off households can diversify their diet or purchase “luxury” foods. 
For those household who have enough food from their own production, the pension can be 
spent on other things. The same observations apply to health spending: different preconditions 
give rise to different patterns of spending. On top of differences in income, the pensioners 
themselves also affect the way the pension is spent. If the pension recipients place great value 
on education, for instance, he is more likely to direct money towards this purpose. 
 There are also potential problems with the pension scheme in Lesotho. The most 
obvious one is the small amount given. Since the pension is shared with the whole household, 
it is not enough to reduce poverty among the elderly to a large extent. In the Parliamentary 
discussions surrounding the pension scheme its role as a helping hand to the elderly was 
underlined, but it is clear that it is being used as a household transfer, not as the pensioner’s 
own money. The pension was never meant to lift a whole household out of poverty, and is 
unable to do so except for the cases where pensioners live alone. Thus, many pensioners are 
left in poverty, even after receiving the pension. This challenges one of the aspects Hanlon et 
al. (2010) laid out as necessary for social transfers, namely that it has to be substantial. 
 In defense of the pension scheme, it is possible to take a broader approach to poverty. I 
have shown how the pensioners themselves value the money they do receive, since it gives 
them the opportunity to give something back to their families for taking care of them. Heslop 
(1999) discussed how some of the characteristics of old age poverty are of a psychological 
nature, including powerlessness and low self-esteem, and the pension can be seen to 
counteract these. In addition, the increasing expenditure on health seen in many pensioner 
households must be thought to benefit the elderly more than any other population group. Poor 
health is another typical characteristic of old age poverty, again showing that the pension does 
affect the poverty of the elderly even if it does not lift them out of income poverty specifically. 
 Another downside to the low pension amount is that it precludes the pension from 
having any significant effect on local markets or investment rates. As I have illustrated, some 
pensioners are able to convert the pension income to productive assets or invest in agriculture, 
but these cases are likely to be outliers and only true for better-off households or households 
with access to more than one pension. The lack of large-scale economic effects is not 
surprising, because of the small amount and because it was never the intention of the scheme. 
Additionally, pensioners as recipients of social transfers may not be the best candidates for 
saving in the first place, and there are concerns about how profitable potential investments can 
be. Nevertheless, it could potentially hurt the long-term sustainability of the scheme, since it 
is not able to “pay for itself” as social protection is capable of in developed countries. 
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 This also has consequences for the degree to which the Lesotho old age pension is 
socially transformative. When defining the concept of social protection above, I noted how 
Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux (2008) argued for regarding this as a central goal to all social 
protection schemes, making it more than a cash transfer given to poor people. The long-term 
aim here is to reshape society, and reduce the dependence on handouts. If one takes this view 
into account when examining the Lesotho old age pension, it is clear that if falls well short of 
the objective. The pension is little more than a cash transfer directed at a vulnerable group, 
and it is hard to imagine it as transformative in and of itself. 
 One exception should be made here, however, namely the fact that the pension allows 
the elderly to invest in the education of their grand- or great grandchildren. Such an 
investment in human capital is more common than investment in productive assets, and can 
possibly have long-term effects on both households and on the country in general. A potential 
obstacle here is that secondary education is still too expensive compared to the pension 
amount, and positive economic effects from a better-educated populace depend on job 
availability and a number of other things that might not be present in Lesotho. 
 A final concern here regards the choice of a pension scheme in the first place. I have 
shown  how older people across the developing world are in need of social protection, and 
also that this need is going to grow in the following decades. In this light, social pensions 
seem like a suitable initiative. Seeing pension schemes in the context of poverty reduction 
might make it seem less desirable, however. The pension obviously misses out on a lot of 
poor households, namely does which do not contain pensioners. This point is true independent 
of the high age of eligibility, as even a lower age limit will exclude non-pensioner households. 
If the ultimate goal is to reduce poverty in the population in general, social pensions might not 
be the best option. This is perhaps especially true in southern Africa, where populations are 
still young. 
 Even if pensions are a less than optimal method for poverty reduction, there are some 
arguments in its favor. For one thing, they are usually more feasible in political terms, as I 
have discussed. In this view, it is better to implement some social protection than none at all. 
Also, in resource-poor countries, implementing broader social programs is often not an option, 
and a pension scheme, categorically targeted in its nature, is a good policy option. Finally, 
while a pension scheme might not reach most poor people, it can reach some of the poorest 
people. The elderly are often excluded from other poverty reduction initiatives, and often 
belong among the most vulnerable groups in developing countries. 
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In sum, then, and comparing to the three goals of social protection as laid out by 
Barrientos and Hulme (2008: 4), the Lesotho old age pension can be seen to meet two of these 
to some extent, namely in protecting “basic levels of consumption among those in poverty or 
in danger of falling into poverty” and in strengthening “the agency of those in poverty so that 
they can overcome their predicament”. The pension largely fails to “facilitate investment in 
human and other productive assets”, thus limiting its impact on the causes of poverty, an 
important goal for many social protection schemes in the developing world. 
 Still, even if Lesotho fails to meet this goal, it must be remembered that Lesotho is a 
small LDC with limited resources and administrative capacity, and that the pension does 
indeed reach its intended beneficiaries and that it contributes significantly to their well-being. 
The interviews I did with pensioners showed how much difference even a small amount of 
cash can make in their lives, both in terms of material things and of self-worth. As Nyanguru 
(2007) notes, Lesotho being able to accomplish this should be a source of public pride, and it 
also shows that other developing countries can implement similar programs. 
 The results from the Lesotho pension scheme are encouraging. This is especially so 
when seen in light of the ageing world population and the lack of social protection for the 
elderly in the developing world.  Seeing these results in a poor country like Lesotho means 
that a well planned social transfer is capable of being effective in poorer countries as well. 
This is especially interesting considering the way the pension has been financed. Through the 
low initial amount and the high age of eligibility, the pension scheme was made affordable 
and fully financed by domestic resources, even if it has affected the impact on poverty. This is 
perhaps one of the most impressive aspect of the Lesotho old age pension, and it does much to 
confirm the idea that social protection does not need to be overly expensive and is indeed 
affordable even in very low-income countries. 
Apart from showing that implementing social protection in LDCs is possible, there are 
also other lessons to take away from the pension scheme in Lesotho. It is clear that the 
political process, as well as the rapid implementation, behind the Lesotho pension scheme has 
been unique and is unlikely to be copied elsewhere, but the way in which Lesotho solved 
issues relating to financial and administrative constraints is illuminating. By choosing a 
simple program design with no means test, as well as by utilizing existing administrative and 
distributional systems, the rapid implementation of the pension scheme was made possible. 
This was also related to the use of voter registration technology in registering pensioners, as 
suggested by Hanlon et al. (2010). 
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Of course, any social transfer must be adapted to national conditions, and the Lesotho 
approach can not be transferred completely to any other context. The small size and 
population of the country makes choosing a universal pension more tenable, and makes a 
means-test unnecessary. In any case, the above results show that implementing social 
pensions in developing countries can work to reduce the depth of poverty, even if it cannot 
eradicate it completely. It must be remembered that one social transfer cannot be expected to 
accomplish everything on its own, and should in the longer term be accompanied by 
investments in other parts of society, as well as expansions to the transfer itself. This is also 
true in the case of Lesotho, though the pension scheme is a step in the right direction.  
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Appendices 
Appendix I:  List of Informants 
 
Name of 
informant(s) 
Characteristics Location of 
household 
Thato 
Maria 
Kelello 
Lerato 
Limpho 
Palesa 
Tumelo and Lipuo 
Tseliso and Libuseng 
Andrew 
Ketso 
Pitso 
Mohale 
Teboho 
Thabo 
Female, 71, lived alone 
Female, 82, lived with three great-grandchildren 
Female, 91, lived with grandson, two grandchildren 
Female, 71, lived with son 
Female, 78, lived with son 
Female, 83, lived with daughter and great-grandchild 
Married, 87 and 74, three-pensioner household 
Married, 74 and 72, lived with two grandchildren 
Male, 90, lived alone 
Male, 71, lived with nephew’s family 
Male, 77, lived in large household 
Male, 72, lived with son’s family of four 
Male, 78, lived with wife, 2 sons and 7 grandchildren 
Male, 71, lived with nephew’s family 
Rural 
Rural 
Rural 
Urban 
Rural 
Rural 
Rural 
Rural 
Rural 
Urban 
Urban 
Rural 
Rural 
Rural 
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Appendix II: Interview guide 
1. Introduction to research 
2. General questions 
 What is your age? 
 For how long have you received the pension? 
 How did you make a living before the pension? 
  Own work, husband’s work, assets owned, etc. 
  How has this changed over time? 
 How many people live in this household? 
  Does anyone hold jobs? 
  What is the approximate income and where does it come from? 
  Do you consider yourself the head of the household? 
3. Pension scheme 
 How do you receive the pension? 
 What do you do with the money on the payout day? 
 How is the pension spent (by categories)? 
  Food, other groceries or items, health, education, larger investments, etc. 
  Does the pension benefit the whole household? 
  What would you have spent money on if the amount/your income had been higher? 
Who controls the spending? 
  Would you like this to be different? 
 The importance of the pension in relation to other household income 
  How would the household manage without the pension income? 
 What are the most important changes in your life since receiving the pension? 
Economic situation, working situation, influence in the household/community, health, 
nutrition 
Examples? 
 Are there any problems with the payment of pensions? 
 Do you think of the pension as a right for all elderly? 
4. Situation for the elderly 
 How would you describe your role in the household? 
  Has this changed with the pension scheme? 
Do you feel that the elderly deserve special respect from their families, communities, 
government? Why? 
Do you get respect from your household? 
 Do you get respect in the village/community? 
  How is this respect/disrespect shown? (examples) 
  Has this changed since the pension scheme? 
 
In summary: Would you say that the pension scheme has helped you and/or you household? 
  What is the most important contribution made by the pension? 
 
5. Wishes for the future/additional information? 
 
